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This dissertation contains three essays that explore various topics in market microstruc-
ture and asset pricing. These topics include statistical arbitrage, algorithmic trading, market
manipulation, and term-structure modeling.
Chapter 1 studies a model of statistical arbitrage trading in an environment with fat-
tailed information. I show that if risk-neutral arbitrageurs are uncertain about the variance
of fat-tail shocks and if they implement max-min robust optimization, they will choose
to ignore a wide range of pricing errors. Although model risk hinders their willingness
to trade, arbitrageurs can capture the most protable opportunities because they follow a
linear momentum strategy beyond the inaction zone. This is exactly equivalent to a famous
machine-learning algorithm called LASSO. Arbitrageurs can also amass market power due to
their conservative trading under this strategy. Their uncoordinated exercise of robust control
facilitates tacit collusion, protecting their prots from being competed away even if their
number goes to innity. This work sheds light on how algorithmic trading by arbitrageurs
may adversely aect the competitiveness and eciency of nancial markets.
Chapter 2 extends the basic model in Chapter 1 by considering an insider who strate-
gically interacts with a group of algorithmic arbitrageurs who follow machine-learning-type
trading strategies. When market liquidity is good enough, arbitrageurs may be induced to
trade too aggressively, giving the insider a reversal trading opportunity. In this case, the in-
sider may play a pump-and-dump strategy to trick those arbitrageurs. This strategy is very
similar to those controversial trading practices (such as momentum ignition and stop-loss
hunting) in reality. We show that such strategies can largely distort price informativeness
and threaten market stability at the expense of common investors. This study reveals a
list of economic conditions under which this type of trade-based manipulations are likely to
occur. Policy implications are discussed as well.
Chapter 3 provides a simple proof for the long-run pricing kernel decomposition devel-
oped by Hansen and Scheinkman (Econometrica, 2009). In a stationary Markovian economy,
the long forward rate should be at so that the pricing kernel can be easily factorized in
a multiplicative form of the transitory and permanent components. The permanent (mar-
tingale) component plays a key role as it induces the change of probabilities to the long
forward measure where the long-maturity discount bond serves as the numeraire. I derive
an explicit expression for this martingale component. It reveals a strong restriction on the
market prices of risk in a popular approach of interest rates modeling. This approach ne-
glects the permanent martingale component and restricts risk premia in a way undesirable
for model calibration. Further analysis demonstrates the advantages of equilibrium modeling
of a production economy since it is featured with a path-dependent pricing kernel that has
a non-degenerate permanent martingale.
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Chapter 1
Statistical Arbitrage with Uncertain Fat
Tails
1.1 Introduction
In nance, extreme movements of asset prices occur much more frequently than predicted
by the tail probabilities of a Gaussian distribution. Such fat-tail events have caused many
problems, as exemplied by the failure of Long Term Capital Management. It is error-prone
to predict fat-tail events or to deal with their higher-order statistics. These diculties give
rise to model risk1 and drive traders to implement robust control. Model risk is a prominent
concern for arbitrageurs whose activities are essential for market eciency. Little is known
about how model risk aects arbitrage trading in a fat-tail environment. This topic is both
practically relevant and theoretically challenging. Answers to this question can provide new
insights into many topics in asset pricing, risk management, and market regulation.
1Model risk is the risk of loss when traders use the wrong model or deal with uncertain model parameters.
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The existence of various anomalies such as momentum suggests that nancial markets
are not completely ecient2. Statistical arbitrage opportunities are also indicative of price
ineciency, because arbitrageurs can make prots given only public information3. To study
statistical arbitrage trading, I introduce random fat-tail shocks to disrupt the ecient market
of a two-period Kyle economy (101). In the standard Kyle model setup, an informed trader
privately observes the stock liquidation value and trades sequentially to maximize her prots,
under the camouage of noise traders and against competitive market makers. A Gaussian
information structure permits a unique linear equilibrium with an ecient linear pricing rule.
In this chapter, I model the stock value as a random realization drawn from either a
Gaussian or a Laplacian distribution, which have the same mean and variance. It is only
observed by an informed trader. The choice of a Laplacian distribution is empirically well-
grounded4. It has fat tails on both sides since its probability density decays exponentially.
This mixture setup allows the stock value to be fat-tailed with some probability. Market
makers believe that they live in the Gaussian world and also regard it as the common belief
among all agents. Market makers have the correct prior about the mean, variance, and
skewness, but incorrect beliefs about higher moments of the stock value distribution. With
Gaussian beliefs, they keep using a linear pricing rule5, which can result in estimation bias
if fat-tail shocks occur. This invites arbitrageurs to correct pricing errors. By assumption,
2As documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (89), the momentum strategy could earn abnormal returns.
3See Ref. (106), (22), (16), (78), and (61) for discussions.
4The Laplace distribution can well characterize the distributions of stock returns sampled at dierent
time horizons. This is documented, for example, by Silva et al. (123).
5The empirical price impact function, which measures the average price change in response to the size of
an incoming order, is roughly linear with slight concavity. See Ref. (108), (65) [p. 453], (58), and (102).
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arbitrageurs are sophisticated enough to distinguish the distribution types (i.e., mispricing
cases), but they face uncertainty about the dispersion of Laplace priors. For robust control,
arbitrageurs make trading decisions under the criterion of max-min expected utility6.
My main nding is that model risk can motivate risk-neutral arbitrageurs to imple-
ment a machine-learning algorithm which mitigates their competition and ignores many
mispricings. This result contains three points that are discussed in greater details below.
First, arbitrageurs' maximin robust strategy has a wide inaction zone: they start
trading only when the observed order ow exceeds three standard deviations of noise trading.
Yet this strategy is eective in catching the most protable trades: arbitrageurs trade less
than 2% of the time but can capture over 60% of the maximum prots they could earn in the
absence of model risk. Under this strategy, arbitrageurs choose to ignore small mispricings.
They focus on large events that involve little uncertainty about the trading direction. Ex post,
an econometrician may nd a lot of mispricings that persist in this economy and question
arbitrageurs' rationality or capacity. In fact, arbitrageurs are rational and risk-neutral in my
setting. They leave money on the table because of their aversion to uncertainty.
Second, my work rationalizes a famous machine-learning method widely used in nance.
The above-mentioned robust strategy is operationally equivalent to a simple algorithm called
the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO)7. This is a powerful tool that
6The theory of max-min expected utility is a standard treatment for ambiguity-averse preferences. It is
axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (63), as a framework for robust decision making under uncertainty.
Related discussions can be found in papers by Dow and Werlang (43), Hansen and Sargent (72), and so on.
7LASSO is a machine-learning technique developed by Tibshirani (124) to improve prediction accuracy
and model interpretability. It is popular among algorithmic traders. This technique has recently been
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can select a few key factors from a large set of regression coecients. The standard statistical
interpretation of LASSO involves a dierent mechanism, namely, the Maximum a Posteriori
estimate. This learning rule lacks Bayesian rationality because it uses the posterior mode as
point estimate, without summarizing all relevant information. In my setup, arbitrageurs are
Bayesian-rational when they decide to use LASSO: they evaluate all possible states using
Bayes' rule and dynamically maximize a well-dened utility with sequential rationality.
Last, the maximin robust strategy supports tacit collusion and impairs market e-
ciency. Arbitrageurs trade conservatively beyond the inaction zone. This enables them to
accumulate market power, which is most prominent near the kinks of their robust strategy.
Thus, uncoordinated exercise of individual robust control facilitates tacit collusion among
traders, without any communication device or explicit agreement. Remarkably, even as the
number of arbitrageurs goes to innity, their total prot does not vanish but converges to
a nite level. This non-competitive payo is due to the cartel eect which hinders price
eciency.
Contributions to the literature. This chapter investigates statistical arbitrage trading
in an uncertain fat-tail environment. This topic requires new methods and inspires fresh
thinking. Results discussed here can contribute in multiple ways to the vast literature of
asset pricing, market microstructure, and behavioral nance.
First, this work develops a new modeling framework for statistical arbitrage. The semi-
strong-form market eciency holds in the standard Kyle (1985) model where traders have
common Gaussian beliefs about the economy. This simple assumption has been followed
employed in many nancial studies, such as Ref. (82), (99), (29), and (56).
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by most subsequent studies8. The present work deviates from the literature by introducing
fat-tail shocks to disrupt the Kyle equilibrium when market makers stick to Gaussian be-
liefs. Unexpected changes in the underlying distribution cause mispricings in the market.
This gives room for arbitrageurs if they can foresee fat-tail shocks. Due to model risk, ar-
bitrageurs are uncertain about the extent of mispricings. If they simply follow the maximin
criterion, they may overemphasize the least favorable prior and become overly pessimistic
in decision making. I implement a rational procedure that prevents such biases. Similar to
the spirit of rational expectations, an internally consistent assumption is that arbitrageurs
inside this model have the correct belief on average about the model structure, despite their
uncertainty about some prior parameter. Recognizing this consistency, a rational arbitrageur
only considers those strategies that converge to the optimal strategy (as averaged across all
possible priors) and that preserve the convexity of their optimal strategy. Such constraints
make their admissible strategies comparable to the ideal rational-expectations strategy9.
Second, this work is the rst to study how market eciency gets hindered by model risk
when arbitrageurs have fat-tail beliefs. This angle distinguishes the present work from the
existing literature on limits to arbitrage10. Previous studies have suggested various important
frictions, including short-selling costs, leverage constraints, and wealth eects, which limit
arbitrageurs' ability to eliminate mispricings. Excluding those frictions, the present work
identies another mechanism that can strongly aect the willingness of arbitrageurs to trade.
Specically, model uncertainty of fat-tail priors make arbitrageurs hesitate to eradicate small
8The literature includes Ref. 6, 79, 53, 54, 128, 7, 129, 85, and 32, among many others.
9The rational-expectations strategy is the one that traders would use if they knew the true Laplace prior.
10Gromb and Vayanos (66) is an excellent survey on this subject. See also 122, 131, 59, 97, among others.
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mispricings, because of ambiguity about the trading direction.
Finally, this work sheds light on interesting topics at the interface of behavioral nance
and machine learning. I use the max-min decision rule to rationalize the LASSO (soft-
thresholding) strategy, which was taken by Gabaix (57) as a behavioral assumption of the
anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism. The LASSO algorithm has an inaction zone where
agents choose to ignore whatever happened, similar to the status quo bias11. The strategy of
arbitrageurs also resembles the behavior of feedback traders discussed in behavioral nance12.
In the eyes of an observer who has a Gaussian prior, arbitrageurs are irrational because
they show up randomly and all perform feedback trading based on historical prices. The
observer's view is incorrect, given his misspecied prior in this economy.
11See Ref. 93 and 120.
12For behavioral interpretations of feedback traders, see Ref. 40, 12, and 13.
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1.2 Model
In this section, I present an equilibrium model to study how arbitrageurs' prior uncertainty
about mispricing shocks aects their arbitrage trading strategy and the eciency of nancial
markets. This model adds random fat-tail shocks to disturb the ecient market of a two-
period Kyle model. Pricing errors arise if market makers use the wrong prior, giving room
for arbitrageurs to make prots on average.
1.2.1 Model Setup
Table 1.1: The timeline and market participants in an economy of two auctions.
.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Informed Trader observe v submit x1 submit x2 receive πx
Noise Traders ... submit u1 submit u2 ...
Arbitrageurs observe s submit z1,n submit z2,n receive πz,n
Market Makers prior N (0, σ2v) set p1 set p2 observe v
7
Structure and Notation. Consider the market in Table 1.1 with two rounds of trading,
indexed by t = 1, 2. The liquidation value of a risky asset, denoted ṽ, is either Gaussian or
Laplacian:




Here, s̃ takes the integer value 1 with probability α and takes the value 0 with probability
1 − α. The true Laplace scale parameter is set to be ξv = σv√2 so that the variance of ṽ is
always σ2v . The initial asset price is set as p0 = 0 without loss of generality. The quantities
traded by noise traders are Gaussian, denoted ũ1 ∼ N (0, σ2u) and ũ2 ∼ N (0, γσ2u). The noise
variances can be dierent, as tuned by the parameter γ > 0. All the random variables ṽ, s̃,
ũ1, and ũ2 are mutually independent. The parameters {σv, σu, γ} are common knowledge.
A risk-neutral informed trader privately observes ṽ at t = 0, submits market orders,
x̃1 and x̃2, to buy or sell this asset before her private signal becomes public at t = 3. The
strategy is denoted by a vector of real-valued functions, X = 〈X1, X2〉. Prices and volumes
become public information right after the auctions take place. The information sets of
informed trader before trading at t = 1, 2 are I1,x = {ṽ} and I2,x = {ṽ, p̃1} where p̃1 is the
asset price at t = 1. It is justied to write x̃1 = X1(ṽ) and x̃2 = X2(ṽ, p̃1). The informed
trader's total prot from both periods can be written as π̃x =
∑2
t=1(ṽ − p̃t)x̃t.
A number of risk-neutral arbitrageurs (indexed by n = 1, ..., N) observe s̃, which
encodes the distribution type of ṽ. Each arbitrageur can place market orders, z̃1,n and z̃2,n, to
exploit potential market ineciency. Their strategy prole is represented by a matrix of real-
valued functions, Z = [Z1, ...,ZN ] where Zn = 〈Z1,n, Z2,n〉 is the n-th arbitrageur's strategy
for n = 1, ..., N . The information sets of arbitrageurs are I1,z = {s̃} and I2,z = {s̃, p̃1} before
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their trading at t = 1, 2. The quantities traded by the n-th arbitrageur are z̃1,n = Z1,n(s̃)
and z̃2,n = Z2,n(s̃, p̃1). The total prot for the n-th trader is denoted π̃z,n =
∑2
t=1(ṽ− p̃t)z̃t,n.
Uninformed competitive market makers clear the market by setting prices at which
they strive to break even. Their pricing strategy is denoted by the vector of real-valued
functions, P = 〈P1, P2〉. The total order ow ỹt ≡ x̃t +
∑N
n=1 z̃t,n + ũt is observed by market
makers before they set the price p̃t at period t ∈ {1, 2}. We can write p̃1 = P1(ỹ1) and
p̃2 = P2(ỹ1, ỹ2).
Belief System. Several assumptions are needed to clarify traders' beliefs in this model:
Assumption 1. The informed trader and market makers think that it was common belief
among all traders that the asset liquidation value was normally distributed, ṽ ∼ N (0, σ2v).
Assumption 2. Arbitrageurs have the correct Gaussian prior when s̃ = 0, but they face
uncertainty about the variance of fat-tail shocks when s̃ = 1. Their Laplace prior is modeled
as L(0, ξ̃) where ξ̃ ∈ Ω is a positive random variable. Arbitrageurs are ambiguity-averse and
maximize the minimum expected payo over all possible priors. On average, arbitrageurs are
correct about the information structure, despite their prior uncertainty.
Assumption 3. Arbitrageurs know that market makers and the informed trader obey As-
sumption 1. Moreover, Assumption 2 is held as common knowledge among arbitrageurs.
Since fat-tail shocks occur with probability α in this market, the higher-order moments
of ṽ can dier from those of the Gaussian counterpart ṽG. When α = 0, the asset value ṽ
is exactly Gaussian and the model reduces to the standard two-period Kyle model. The








, has fat tails as it decays to zero at
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an exponential rate. Thus, the likelihood of observing extreme events under the Laplace
distribution is much higher than under the Gaussian distribution with identical variance.
Knowledge of s̃ is valuable since it tells traders the distribution type of stock value.
If market makers have fat-tail beliefs and observe s̃ = 1, they should use a convex pricing
rule (which is rarely seen in real data). The Gaussian prior in Assumption 1 permits linear
pricing schedules compatible with empirical observations. Despite its simplicity, the linear
pricing function can underestimate the fat-tail information in large order ows. This opens
the door to arbitrageurs because market makers have mistakes with probability α.
Arbitrageurs are sophisticated traders who may use advanced technology to detect mis-
pricings. Their privilege of observing s̃ represents their superior ability to identify statistical
arbitrage opportunities. Nonetheless, arbitrageurs often face uncertainty about their trading
models. The failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) demonstrates the critical
role of model risk and the disastrous impact when the worst-case scenario hit. This motivates
Assumption 2 that arbitrageurs care about the worst-case expected prots for robustness.
As proved by Gilboa and Schmeidler (63), the max-min expected utility theory rationalizes
ambiguity-averse preferences. However, decisions derived from maximin optimization tend
to follow the least favorable prior regardless of its likelihood. This appears too pessimistic.
A more realistic assumption is that arbitrageurs' admissible strategies converge, in a rational
manner13, to the average of optimal strategies evaluated across all possible priors. Similar to
the concept of rational expectations, I assume that arbitrageurs inside this model are correct
on average about the model structure. Without systematic bias, the average of optimal
13To avoid overtting, their admissible strategy should preserve the convexity of their optimal strategies.
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strategies across all possible priors should converge to the rational-expectations equilibrium
(REE) strategy which corresponds to the ideal case that they know the true prior ξv.
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 capture salient features of real-life arbitrage. In a nearly
ecient market, arbitrage opportunities should be rare and thus overlooked by most market
participants. Such opportunities may be identied and exploited by a small number of traders
(i.e., arbitrageurs who observe s̃). What may limit their trading is the model risk and their
imperfect competition. Arbitrageurs are likely to have similar priors and preferences, given
that they have similar forecasting technology and face similar pressures of robust control.
The belief system described in Assumption 1 can be denoted as B = {s̃ = 0}, which is
shared by the informed trader and market makers. They think that it is common knowledge
among all traders that ṽ ∼ N (0, σ2v). Arbitrageurs are aware of their Gaussian belief B.
By Assumptions 2 and 3, the belief system shared by arbitrageurs can be expressed as
A = {s̃, ξ̃}, where ξ̃ denotes the uncertain Laplace prior. Arbitrageurs' belief depends on
the observed s̃ which tells them the type of prior to use:
ṽ ∼ N (0, σ2v) if A = {s̃ = 0, ξ̃} and ṽ ∼ L(0, ξ̃) if A = {s̃ = 1, ξ̃}. (1.2)
Obviously, A and B are consistent when s̃ = 0 but they are at odds when s̃ = 1. Market
makers believe that any uninformed trader holds the same Gaussian prior as they do. In
fact, arbitrageurs can infer that market makers use the wrong prior when s̃ = 1.14.
14This is not agreement to disagree because traders have inconsistent belief structures here. Han and
Kyle (67) discussed the situation where traders have inconsistent beliefs about the mean. In my model,
traders agree on the mean but hold inconsistent beliefs about higher moments of ṽ.
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1.2.2 Equilibrium Denition
The trading of arbitrageurs aects the realized prot of informed trader π̃x. To emphasize its
dependence on all traders' strategies, we write π̃x = π̃x(X,P,Z). Similarly, each arbitrageur
takes into account the strategies played by other traders. To stress such dependence, we
write z̃t,n = z̃t,n(X,P,Z) and π̃z,n = π̃z,n(X,P,Z) for n = 1, ..., N . By Assumption 2, each













∣∣∣∣s̃, ξ̃ = ξ
]
, (1.3)
where Zn = 〈z1,n, z2,n〉. Both z1,n and z2,n are in the admissible set Z which requires asymp-
totic convergence to the REE without losing the convexity/concavity of the REE strategy.
Denition of Equilibrium. A sequential trading equilibrium in this model is dened as a
tuple of strategies (X,P,Z) such that the following conditions hold:
1. For any alternative strategy X′ = 〈X ′1, X ′2〉 diering from X = 〈X1, X2〉, the strategy
X yields an expected total prot no less than X′, and also X2 yields an expected prot
in the second period no less than the single deviation X ′2:
EB[π̃x(X,P,Z)|ṽ] ≥ EB[π̃x(X′,P,Z)|ṽ], (1.4)
EB[(ṽ − p̃2(〈X1, X2〉,P,Z))X2|ṽ, p̃1] ≥ EB[(ṽ − p̃2(〈X1, X ′2〉,P,Z))X ′2|ṽ, p̃1].(1.5)
2. For all n = 1, ..., N and any alternative strategy prole Z′ diering from Z only in the
n-th component Z′n = 〈Z ′1,n, Z ′2,n〉, the strategy prole Z yields a utility level (i.e., the
minimum expected prot over all possible priors) no less than Z′, and also Z2,n yields
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a utility level in the second period no less than the single deviation Z ′2,n:
min
ξ∈Ω
EA[π̃z,n(X,P,Z)|s̃, ξ̃ = ξ] ≥ min
ξ∈Ω
EA[π̃z,n(X,P,Z
′)|s̃, ξ̃ = ξ]; (1.6)
min
ξ∈Ω
EA[(ṽ − p̃2(·, Z2,n))Z2,n|s̃, p̃1, ξ̃ = ξ] ≥ min
ξ∈Ω
EA[(ṽ − p̃2(·, Z ′2,n))Z ′2,n|s̃, p̃1, ξ̃ = ξ],(1.7)
where the strategy prole on the right hand side of Eq. (1.7) only diers from (X,P,Z)
at Z2,n. Any strategy considered by arbitrageurs has to be in the admissible set Z.
3. The prices, P = 〈P1, P2〉, are set by the market makers' posterior expectation of ṽ:
p̃1 = P1(ỹ1) = E
B[ṽ|ỹ1], and p̃2 = P2(ỹ1, ỹ2) = EB[ṽ|ỹ1, ỹ2]. (1.8)
Equilibrium Conjecture. The full equilibrium (X,P,Z) can be characterized separately. The
informed trader and market makers believe that they were living in a two-period Kyle model
(Assumption 1). They think that arbitrageurs held the same Gaussian belief and would not
trade in a conjectured equilibrium with (semi-strong-form) market eciency. This inspires
them to conjecture a subgame perfect linear equilibrium (X,P).
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, there exists a unique subgame perfect linear equi-
librium (X,P) identical to the linear equilibrium of a two-period Kyle model with normally
distributed random variables. Market makers set the linear pricing rule:






, λ2 = δλ1.(1.9)
The equilibrium ratio δ = λ2
λ1
is determined by the largest root to the cubic equation:
8γδ3 − 4γδ2 − 4δ + 1 = 0. (1.10)
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The informed trader follows the linear trading strategy:












where ρ ≡ 4δ−1
2δ−1 is a liquidity-dependent parameter that reects the trading intensity at t = 1.
Informed trader and market makers believe that no arbitrageurs would trade under (X,P).
Proof. This is an extension of Proposition 1 in Huddart et al. (85). See Appendix 1.5.1.
To break even under dierent liquidity conditions, market makers can adjust the slopes
of linear pricing schedules. For example, when noise trading volatility is constant (i.e., γ = 1),
they can solve from Eq. (1.10) that δ ≈ 0.901; when γ = 3
4
, they can nd that δ = 1 and










and λ2 → ∞. It is convenient to introduce a dimensionless parameter to denote
the liquidity condition. Market depth is usually measured by the inverse of price impact








In general, µ ∈ [−1, 1]. For example, µ = 0.5 indicates a 50% drop of market depth, while
µ = 0 reects constant depth. Market depth becomes higher (i.e., µ < 0) if γ > 3
4
.
If market makers know that ṽ is drawn from the mixture distribution, the linear pricing
rule in Eq. (1.9) can still help them to break even, regardless of the mixture parameter α.
Linear pricing preserves the symmetry of probability distributions so that market makers'
unconditional expected prots are zero : E[(p̃2− ṽ)ỹ2] = 0 and E[(p̃1− ṽ)ỹ1 +(p̃2− ṽ)ỹ2] = 0.
This shows the robustness of linear pricing strategy and may explain its popularity.
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By Proposition 1, the informed trader and market makers believe that no arbitrageurs
would trade in this market. Thus, any strategy prole Z does not aect the linear equilibrium
strategies X and P. Arbitrageurs can take Proposition 1 as given when solving their own
dynamic optimization problems Eq. (1.6) and Eq. (1.7). Arbitrageurs know that the
informed trader and market makers do not anticipate their trading. Arbitrageurs take into
account the price impacts of all traders in the market. When s = 0, the belief structure of all
traders is consistent and correct. In this case, arbitrageurs have no advantage over market
makers.
Corollary 1. When s = 0, arbitrageurs do not trade because the market is indeed ecient.
Arbitrageurs are better informed than market makers in the presence of fat-tail
shocks. Will they trade immediately? Let us conjecture now and verify later that arbi-
trageurs would not trade in the rst period. This is intuitive given the symmetry of their
priors and the linearity of pricing rule. It simplies the procedure to solve this equilibrium.
First, Eq. (1.7) can be used to derive the optimal strategy prole 〈Z2,1, ..., Z2,N〉 in the next
period under the conjecture that Z1,n = 0 for all n = 1, ..., N . Second, Eq. (1.6) can be used
to verify that it is not a protable deviation for any arbitrageur to trade in the rst period.




1.3.1 Optimal Strategy without Model Risk




Intuitively, the quantities traded by them in the presence of fat-tail shocks are proportional
to their conditional expectation of the stock value mispriced by the market. Of course,
the posterior estimate of ṽ depends on their fat-tail priors. It is helpful to study the ideal
case that model risk vanishes. If there is no ambiguity in their prior, arbitrageurs become
subjective expected utility optimizers, under their Laplace prior L(0, ξ) when s = 1.
Proposition 2. In the absence of model risk, arbitrageurs maximize their expected prots.
Over the liquidity regime µ > µε ≈ −0.2319 where µε is the largest root to the cubic equation
µ3 + 21µ2 + 35µ + 7 = 0, arbitrageurs do not trade at t = 1 and their optimal strategy at
t = 2 is proportional to their posterior expectation of θ̃ = ṽ − p1 under the prior L(0, ξ):
Zo2,n(s, y1; ξ) = s
1− µ
N + 1







, n = 1, ..., N. (1.13)
The estimator v̂(y1; ξ) is the posterior mean of ṽ under the prior that ṽ is drawn from L(0, ξ):






























The rescaled estimator v̂/ξ is an increasing function of the rescaled quantity y′ = y1/σu, with
one dimensionless shape parameter, κ ≡ ρλ1σu
ξ
. The rational-expectations equilibrium (REE)




Proof. See Appendix 1.5.2.
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Arbitrageurs only trade when fat-tail shocks occur. In the eyes of some econometrician
who holds the Gaussian belief and trusts in market eciency, those arbitrageurs seem to
be irrational because they show up randomly and behave like feedback traders. This may
raise various behavioral arguments, without recognizing the misspecication of priors.
Arbitrageurs' prior is symmetric (non-directional) at the beginning. They postpone
arbitrage trading until they could tell the trading direction from past price movements, or
equivalently, until their posterior beliefs become skewed. Proposition 2 conrms this no-trade
conjecture in the rst period. It also explains why this study starts from a two-period setup.
Even though arbitrageurs are better informed (with the knowledge of s̃) than market makers,
their prior expectation of the stock value is identical to market makers'. Arbitrageurs have
to watch the market rst to see in which direction market makers incur pricing errors. This
wait-and-see strategy suggests that arbitrage trading can be delayed for learning purposes
so that mispricings may sustain for a longer period of time. The mechanism here is dierent
from the delayed arbitrage discussed in the paper by Abreu and Brunnermeier (1) where
arbitrageurs face uncertainty about when their peers will exploit a common arbitrage.
The optimal strategy is symmetric with the past order ow: Zo2,n(s,−y1) = −Zo2,n(s, y1).
The rescaled strategy, Zo2,n/σu, is a function of the rescaled order ow y
′ = y1/σu in the fat-
tail case. The optimal strategy becomes almost linear at large order ows. Its asymptotic
slope is equal to the slope of linear strategy for traders who have a uniform prior (ξ →∞).
Examination of the rst and second derivatives leads to the following statement.
Corollary 2. When s = 1, the optimal strategy Zo2,n(s, y1) is convex in the positive domain





1.3.2 Robust Strategy under Model Risk
As indicated by Eq. (1.14), the estimator v̂ depends on the dispersion of Laplace prior, ξ.
How would arbitrageurs trade when they have uncertain priors? Model risk is a critical issue
in statistical arbitrage, because using a wrong prior could yield a business disaster like the
failure of LTCM. In the real world, traders often face the pressure to test the performance of
their strategies in the worst-case scenario. This pressure can drive them to adopt alternative
strategies that sacrice some optimality for robustness.













Figure 1.1: The optimal strategy Zo2,n(s = 1, y1; ξ) in Eq. (1.13) under dierent values of ξ.
Fig. 1.1 shows the optimal strategy under dierent values of the Laplace parameter
ξ. An arbitrageur with the prior ξ → 0 believes that the stock value is unchanged (i.e.,
ṽ = 0). This trader will attribute all the order ow y1 to noise trading and trade against
any price change. In contrast, an arbitrageur with the extreme prior ξ → ∞ believes that
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the past order ow is dominated by informed trading and thus will chase the price trend
straightly. For small ξ, arbitrageurs will engage in contrarian trading on small order ows
which are dominated by noise trading under their belief. For large ξ, arbitrageurs always
use a momentum strategy.
Suppose that arbitrageurs' uncertain prior ξ̃ is in the interval [ξL, ξH ], where both the
highest and lowest priors, ξH and ξL, have non-zero chances. If the divergence between ξH and
ξL is large enough, arbitrageurs can face ambiguity about the trading direction conditional
on small order ows15: they may want to buy the asset under a high prior (for example,
ξ = 3 in Fig. 1.1) but sell it under a low prior (for example, ξ = 1 in Fig. 1.1). If they use
the wrong prior, they may trade in the wrong direction and undergo adverse fat-tail shocks.
By Assumption 2, arbitrageurs rank strategies based on the maximin decision criterion,
i.e., each arbitrageur maximizes the minimum expected prot over a set of multiple priors.
Pure maximin optimization can give very pessimistic decisions which stick to the least fa-
vorable prior even if it has a tiny chance to occur. To avoid over-pessimistic responses, I
assume that arbitrageurs' admissible strategies converge to the averaged optimal strategy
(across all priors) in a rational manner that preserves its convexity and/or concavity. Let's
also enforce internal consistency: arbitrageurs inside this model know its structure in a
statistical sense. On average, they are correct about the economy without systematic bias.
First, it is reasonable and important to invoke the convergence condition. If arbi-
trageurs observe an extremely large order ow y1, they will be pretty sure that y1 was dom-
inated by informed trading in the fat-tail scenario. This resolves their ambiguity about
15If the extreme priors satisfy y1Z
o
2,n(s, y1; ξH) > 0 for any y1 6= 0 and y1Zo2,n(s, y1; ξL) ≤ 0 for a nonzero
measure of y1, then dierent fat-tail priors can give opposite trading directions at small order ows.
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trading directions and boosts their condence to follow the averaged optimal strategy,





· y1 − sign(y1)Kξ
N + 1





To ensure internal consistency, Eq. (1.15) should coincide with the asymptotes of the
rational-expectations equilibrium (REE) strategy given the true prior ξv. This requires















The condition EA[ξ̃−1] = ξ−1v means that arbitrageurs' average belief is correct regarding the
precision of Laplace prior. Similar to the concept of rational expectations, arbitrageurs inside
this model make unbiased predictions on average, despite their uncertainty about the model
structure. Any candidate strategy should converge to Z∞(y1, K
∗). This condition ensures
that the strategy space of arbitrageurs is anchored to their REE strategy (benchmark).
Second, the admissible strategies should rationally preserve the convexity and/or con-
cavity of the optimal strategy. By Corollary 2, any optimal strategy (without model risk)
is convex in the positive domain and concave otherwise (Fig. 1.1). Thus, any candidate
strategy must be convex in the regime of y1 > 0 and concave in the regime of y1 < 0. With-
out this convexity-preserving condition, traders would consider strategies with arbitrarily












Figure 1.2: The robust strategy Z2,n in the presence of model risk.
Any strategy that converges to the REE strategy without losing its convex property
must lie in the shaded areas of Fig. 1.2. Any strategy running outside this area violates either
the convergence condition or the convexity-preserving rule. We can focus on the positive
domain and divide the shaded area into three regions. For any y1 ∈ [0, K∗], arbitrageurs will
not sell against y1, because they may lose money if the highest prior ξH is true. This rules
out any decision point inside the triangle a. Similarly, arbitrageurs will not buy the stock
since they may also lose money if the lowest prior ξL is true. This rules out any decision
point inside the triangle b. So the max-min choice criteria indicate a no-trade zone over
y1 ∈ [0, K∗]. Next, for any y1 > K∗, ambiguity-averse traders should not trade a quantity
more than the one prescribed by the REE asymptotes Z∞(y1, K
∗); otherwise they may lose
in the worst-case scenario. This argument rules out any decision point inside the region c.
By symmetry, the robust strategy turns out to be a piecewise linear function of y1, with the
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trading threshold K∗. This simple strategy is labeled by the red line in Fig. 1.2.
Proposition 3. If arbitrageurs face sucient model uncertainty about the fat-tail priors and
if they follow the max-min choice criteria to rank the admissible strategies dened before, then
their robust strategy at t = 2 is a piece-wise linear function of the order ow at t = 1:
Z2,n(s, y1;K




· y1 − sign(y1)K
∗
N + 1
· 1|y1|>K∗ , (1.17)
which is along the REE asymptotes with the trading threshold K∗ given by Eq. (1.16).
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.3.
The endogenous decision boundary K∗ is independent of the number of arbitrageurs
(N) or the variance of asset value (σ2v). For constant noise trading volatility (γ = 1), one
can nd K∗ ≈ 3.063σu which is roughly three standard deviations of noise order ows. This
indicates a very large inaction zone for the robust strategy. To see how inactive it is, let us






σ2u, which implies K
∗ ≈ 2.5483σy. When the asset value ṽ is Laplacian, the probability
that arbitrageurs get triggered to trade is very small, P (|y1| > K∗) ≈ 1.33%. One might
think that such a strategy is too inert to be protable. This is not true. Numerically, the
robust strategy can capture about 60% of the maximum prot recouped by the ideal REE
strategy. This performance is surprisingly good given the idleness of the robust strategy.
Fat-tail shocks create a disproportionate distribution of mispricings. The robust strategy is
eective in picking up most protable trades which correspond to those large fat-tail events.
So far, I have discussed various belief-related reasons for arbitrageurs' inaction. Their
no-trade conditions are summarized as follows:
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Corollary 3. Arbitrageurs do not trade if any of the following conditions holds:
(1) the market is ecient in the semi-strong form under their belief;
(2) their prior expectation of ṽ is identical to market makers' expectation;
(3) the past price change cannot drive them out of their inaction (ambiguity) zone.
Proof. Condition (1) holds at s̃ = 0, Condition (2) holds for their decision making at t = 1,
and Condition (3) is implied by Proposition 3.
Given their idleness, it may well be the case that arbitrageurs are overlooked by the rest of
the market. This is self-consistent with the implication of Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
More importantly, given their no-trade strategy in the rst period and inaction re-
gion in the second period, a lot of pricing errors can persist in this market. Ex post, an
econometrician can run regressions on historical data to discover many mispricings in this
economy. The econometrician may question the rationality or capability of arbitrageurs as
they apparently leave money on the table. Ex ante, arbitrageurs assess all possible states
using Bayes' rule. They are risk-neutral but ambiguity averse. For maximin robustness,
they rationally ignore small prot opportunities which involve ambiguity about the trading
direction. Neither nancial constraints nor trading frictions exist here. There is no limit
to arbitrageurs' trading ability. It is model risk that reduces their willingness to eliminate
mispricings. This intrinsic friction is especially important in the fat-tail world where it leads
to a large no-trade zone.
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1.3.3 Equivalent Learning Rule and Alternative Interpretations
The optimal strategy without model risk uses the posterior mean estimate in Bayesian learn-
ing (Proposition 2). What is the learning mechanism behind the robust strategy? Arbi-
trageurs are Bayesian rational when they solve their maximin objectives, Eq. (1.6) and Eq.
(1.7). It is noteworthy that the derived (robust) strategy is observationally equivalent to
the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO), a famous machine-learning
technique developed by Tibshirani (124). The LASSO estimate can be interpreted as the
posterior mode under independent Laplace prior. In statistics, the posterior mode is for-
mally known as the Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) estimate. This learning rule itself lacks
Bayesian rationality because it does not use all relevant information in forming expectations
of unknown variables16. Nonetheless, the MAP estimate can produce the robust strategy.
Proposition 4. If arbitrageurs know the true Laplace prior ξv but directly use the MAP
learning rule to estimate the mispricing signal θ̃ = ṽ − p1, then their strategy in the second
period will be operationally equivalent to the robust strategy in Proposition 3:








Here, θ̂map is the MAP estimate of θ̃. It contains v̂map which is the MAP estimate of ṽ under







v̂map(y1; ξv) = ρλ1[y1 − sign(y1)κσu]1|y1|>κσu . (1.19)
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.4.
16The MAP estimate of a variable equals the mode of the posterior distribution. As a point estimate, it







Figure 1.3: (a) The posterior mean versus the posterior mode of ṽ under the Laplace prior
L(0, ξv). (b) the optimal (REE) strategy versus the robust strategy at t = 2 when s = 1.
Fig. 1.3 compares the learning rules and their associated strategies. Both the posterior
mean estimate v̂ and the REE strategy Zo2,n(s = 1, y1; ξv) are smooth and nonlinear. In
contrast, the posterior mode estimate v̂map is zero for y1 ∈ [−κσu, κσu] and linear beyond
that zone. The robust strategy Z2,n has a similar pattern as it performs linear momentum
trading beyond the inaction zone [−K∗, K∗]. Traders who follow this strategy only respond
to large events and deliberately ignore small ones. This rational response is similar to various
behavioral patterns, including limited attention, status quo bias, anchoring and adjustment,
among others17. Again, it is worth stressing that arbitrageurs are Bayesian-rational here:
they evaluate all possible states using Bayes rule and maximize their well-dened utility
with sequential rationality. One can apply Propositions 3 and 4 to rationalize the behavioral
assumption of Gabaix (57). In his model, the soft-thresholding function like Eq. (1.19) is
17Barberis and Thaler (14) provide an excellent survey on those topics in behavioral nance.
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used to describe the anchoring bias. Such behavior also permits a rational interpretation.
In a multi-asset economy subject to uncertain fat-tail shocks, Proposition 4 implies
that arbitrageurs can directly incorporate the LASSO algorithm into their trading system:
Corollary 4. Suppose that arbitrageurs identify M ≥ 1 assets with independent and identi-
cally distributed liquidation values, ṽi ∼ L(0, ξv) for i = 1, ...,M , and each of these assets is
traded by a single informed trader in the two-period Kyle model with constant noise trading.






∣∣∣∣2 + 2(λ1σu)2ξv |vi|, (1.20)
where p1,i = λ1y1,i is the price change of the i-th asset and ρ
−1 is the percentage of private




· p1,i ± 2ξv
2λ2
· 1|p1,i|≥2ξv , for i = 1, ...,M, (1.21)
which is automatically triggered to trade the i-th asset if its price change p1,i exceeds ±2ξv.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.4.
The objective of maximizing the posterior (under MAP) is equivalent to the minimiza-
tion problem Eq. (1.20). It involves an l1 penalty term that comes from the Laplace prior
L(0, ξv). LASSO shrinks certain estimation coecients to zero and eectively selects a sim-
pler model that exclude those coecients. This is a popular tool among quantitative traders
because it picks up a small number of key features (factors) from a large set of candidate
features. For traders who use LASSO, their trading models shall involve fat-tail (typically
Laplace) priors. If traders use the Gaussian prior instead, they will incur an l2 penalty in
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their objective. The resulted algorithm is ridge regression which uniformly shrinks the size
of all coecients but does not send any coecients to zero. Even with parameter uncer-
tainty about the Gaussian prior, traders will not get an inaction zone. This is because signal
inference is linear when the posterior is Gaussian. For symmetric unimodal distributions,
the mean coincides with the mode; the two learning rules will give identical predictions.
Since dierent Gaussian priors only change the slopes of linear responses, the maximin ro-
bust strategy in a pure Gaussian-mixture model will be linear; see Appendix 1.5.4 for more
details.
Corollary 4 can help explain the momentum strategy and anomaly in asset pricing18.
Short-term momentum traders can be viewed as statistical arbitrageurs who have uncertain
fat-tail priors about mispriced stocks. Their robust trading is exactly the momentum strategy
of buying winners and selling losers. Those traders usually focus on top market gainers and
losers, instead of the entire universe of equities. Corollary 4 can also be used to interpret
rule-based algorithmic trading which gets triggered at some predened price levels. At rst
glance, such trading behavior seems to be mechanical and at odds with Bayesian rationality.
It is possible that algorithmic traders are Bayesian-rational. They may use machine-learning
techniques (such as LASSO) to manage unknown risks or improve prediction accuracy.
The robust LASSO strategy can also be used by market makers for error self-correction.
Market makers can split their pricing logic into two programs. The rst one is the linear
pricing strategy which allows them to almost break even, despite their occasional mistakes.
The second program uses the fat-tail prior to correct the errors of linear pricing strategy,
18See Ref. 89, 28, 23, 80, 38, 105, among others.
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just like the actions of arbitrageurs. This leads to the LASSO algorithm. Integrating both
programs, market makers can keep using the linear pricing rule until their inventory exceeds
the endogenous thresholds. At that point, they will switch to momentum trading and reduce
excessive inventories. The no-trade zone in the second program is the ambiguity zone where
they hesitate to correct uncertain pricing errors; this no-trade zone is also their comfortable
zone to do market making. This new interpretation diers from conventional arguments that
market makers' inventory limits are due to their high risk aversion or large inventory costs.
1.3.4 Cartel Eect and Market Ineciency
Arbitrageurs trade conservatively beyond the endogenous inaction zone. Their conservative
trading facilitates their tacit collusion which mitigates their competition and impedes market
eciency. This has interesting implications for limits to arbitrage.
Proposition 5. As N → ∞, the total prot of arbitrageurs vanishes if they use the REE
strategy. However, their total prot has a positive limit if they follow the robust strategy.
Proof. If arbitrageurs all follow the optimal REE strategy Zo2,n(s, y1; ξv), they will compete























(N + 1)(ṽ − λ1ỹ1)−N(v̂ − λ1ỹ1)
2(N + 1)







EA[(v̂(ỹ1)− λ1ỹ1)2] = 0, (1.22)
where in the above derivation we have used Eq. (1.11) and EA[ṽ] = EA[EA[ṽ|ỹ1]] = EA[v̂(ỹ1)].
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In contrast, if arbitrageurs follow the robust strategy Z2,n(s, y1;K
∗), their total arbi-


























where in the above derivation we have used Eq. (1.18) and EA[ṽ] = EA[v̂(ỹ1)]. The expression
of the MAP estimate θ̂map ≡ (v̂map−λ1ỹ1)1|ỹ1|>K∗ implies (v̂map−λ1ỹ1)θ̂map = θ̂2map. The last




















Figure 1.4: (a) The arbitrageurs' total prot under the robust strategy conditional on y1.
(b) The total arbitrage prot under the REE strategy vs. that under the robust strategy.
Fig. 1.4(a) shows the total prot of a hundred arbitrageurs who follow the robust
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strategy, conditional on the observed order ow y1. This prot prole (red curve) is propor-
tional to the term (v̂− v̂map) · θ̂map in Eq. (1.23). It exhibits two spikes of prots beyond the
trading thresholds (labeled by blue circles). These spikes indicate the major source of their
extra prots. Intuitively, arbitrageurs' under-trading is most prominent near the kinks of
their robust strategy. Their non-competitive prots must be strongest there.
Fig. 1.4(b) compares the total payos to arbitrageurs when they follow dierent types
of strategies. In the oligopolistic case (i.e., small N), the REE strategy allows them to earn
higher prots, because the robust strategy ignores a wide range of prot opportunities. As
N increases, the protability of the REE strategy decays faster. In the competitive limit,
arbitrageurs compete away their prots under REE and restore market eciency at t = 2.
In contrast, arbitrageurs' total payo converges to a positive value when they follow the
robust strategy [Fig. 1.4(b)]. This conrms Proposition 5 and indicates a non-competitive
eect. Their positive limiting payo is attributable to the market power they amass beyond
the inaction zone, where they trade less aggressively than they would do under REE [Fig.
1.3 and Fig. 1.4(a)]. This collusive behavior does not involve any communication device or
explicit agreement. Their tacit collusion is not a result of nancial constraints or trading
frictions. It is due to traders' robust control for (non-Gaussian) model risk. Outside their
inaction region, the cartel eect will prevent the market from being fully ecient .
Corollary 5. In the limit N → ∞, arbitrageurs will restore market eciency when they
follow the REE strategy, i.e., limN→∞ E
A[P2(ỹ1, ỹ2)|ỹ1] = EA[ṽ|ỹ1] under Zo2,n(s, y1; ξv) for
n = 1, ..., N ; however, market eciency is hindered when a nite fraction of arbitrageurs
follow the robust strategy, i.e., limN→∞ E
A[P2(ỹ1, ỹ2)|ỹ1] 6= EA[ṽ|ỹ1] under Z2,n(s, y1;K∗).
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Proof. See Appendix 1.5.5.
By Corollary 5, it is dicult to restore market eciency even if the economy hosts an
innite number of risk-neutral arbitrageurs. To restore price eciency in the second period,
it requires that (almost) every arbitrageur follows the REE strategy, that is, (almost) every
arbitrageur knows on average the correct fat-tail prior and has no aversion to uncertainty.
This is practically impossible because real-life arbitrageurs face dierent levels of model risks.
Moreover, there exist both internal and external pressures that force them to manage such
risks. Their robust control easily translates to their ambiguity aversion, which signicantly
limits their willingness to eliminate mispricings. As reviewed by Gromb and Vayanos (66),
existing studies mostly focus on dierent costs that limits arbitrageurs' ability in trading.
Those frictions could be eased by injecting sucient capital or removing certain constraints.
The mechanism here is dierent. First, model risk is an intrinsic problem which may not be
resolved easily. Second, arbitrageurs here are able to eliminate pricing errors; they hesitate to
do so because of their aversion to uncertainty19. Third, arbitrageurs' hesitation in arbitrage
has two characteristics: (1) the large inaction region tells them to leave money on the table;
(2) their undertrading beyond the inaction region supports them as a cartel. Consequently,
even with an innite number of risk-neutral arbitrageurs, a wide range of pricing errors can
persist in this economy. This is an endogenous outcome of model risk.
Nowadays, nancial markets have been largely occupied by algorithmic traders. The
surge of quantitative modeling and machine-learning techniques can bring about hidden
19Arbitrageurs are risk-neutral but ambiguity-averse in this setup. Their hesitation to perform arbitrage
trading is not due to their risk aversion.
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issues. The present work demonstrates that statistical arbitrageurs can use machine-learning
tools to combat model uncertainty and similar algorithmic kinks in their strategy can
mitigate their competition at the expense of market eciency. This is a general implication,
given that many machine-learning algorithms have inaction regions and decision kinks.
Equilibrium Condition. In the liquidity regime µ < 0, an arbitrageur may nd it protable
to trade in the rst period and take advantage of the aggressive feedback trading of other
arbitrageurs. One can verify Eq. (1.6) to see whether this unilateral deviation is protable.
Corollary 6. The conjectured equilibrium strategy prole may fail in the liquidity regime µ <





1−µ . Given a large number
of arbitrageurs using the same robust strategy, it can be protable for an individual trader
to deviate from the conjectured no-trade strategy in the rst period. This deviation involves
trading a large quantity z1  K∗ to trigger the other arbitrageurs and then unwinding the
position at more favorable prices supported by the over-aggressive trading of others.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.6
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter studies an equilibrium model of strategic arbitrage in the fat-tail environ-
ment. The presence of arbitrageurs is rationalized by applying random fat-tail shocks to
the standard Kyle model where market makers adhere to Gaussian beliefs. If arbitrageurs
are uncertain about the various of fat-tail shocks, their robust strategy under the max-min
choice criteria is operationally equivalent to the LASSO algorithm in machine learning. For
robustness, arbitrageurs choose to ignore a wide range of small (uncertain) mispricings and
take actions only on large (certain) ones. This strategy is highly eective given its infrequent
trading activity. As a result, many anomalies may be detected ex post by an external econo-
metrician based on historical data in this economy. The econometrician may conclude that
market ineciency is due to arbitrageurs' behavioral bias as they overlook those anomalies.
In fact, arbitrageurs are rational under their robust-control objective. They use Bayes rule
to carefully evaluate all possible states over their multiple priors. Arbitrageurs can amass
signicant market power due to their under-trading beyond the kinks of robust strategy.
This cartel eect allows them to earn noncompetitive prots which do not vanish even if
their number goes to innity. Therefore, price eciency is further impaired.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Under their common belief, the informed trader and market makers rst conjecture that
arbitrageurs do not trade if the market is ecient. As in the two-period Kyle model, they
can seek a linear equilibrium (X,P), where P = 〈P1, P2〉 is the linear pricing strategy of
market makers. Let P1(y1) = λ1y1 and P2(y1, y2) = λ1y1 + λ2y2. The information set of
informed trader before trading at t = 2 is I2,x = {v, y1}. After t = 1, she conjectures the
price at t = 2 as
p̃2 = P2(ỹ1, ỹ2) = λ1y1 + λ2[X2(v, y1) + ũ2], under {I2,x,B}. (1.24)
Her optimal strategy at t = 2 under the information set I2,x and belief system B is
X2(v, y1) = arg max
x2




The informed trader conjectures the price at t = 1 to be p̃1 = λ1[X1(v)+ ũ1] under {I1,x,B}.
With this notion and X2(v, y1), her subjective expected prot is a quadratic function of x1:
Πx(v, x1) = x1(v − λ1x1) + EB
[
(v − λ1(x1 + ũ1))2
4λ2
∣∣∣∣I1,x = {v}] . (1.26)
The rst order condition is 0 = v − 2λ1x1 − v−λ1x12δ , where δ ≡
λ2
λ1










where ρ = 4δ−1
2δ−1 . The above results constitute Eq. (1.11) in Proposition 1. Market makers
hold the same Gaussian belief. As an extension of Proposition 1 in Huddart et al. (85), it






, where the ratio δ is given
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by the largest root to the cubic equation:
8γδ3 − 4γδ2 − 4δ + 1 = 0. (1.28)
Here, γ > 0 is the ratio of noise trading volatilities over time. Under this pair of linear
strategies X and P, prices are conditional expectations of public information under market
makers' belief B. So the informed trader and market makers believe that if they play X and
P no arbitrageurs would trade. This conrms the initial conjecture and completes the proof.
1.5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Arbitrageurs know that they are not anticipated to trade by the informed trader and market
makers. In the Gaussian case (s = 0), they have no informational advantage over market
makers. The market is ecient under the subgame perfect equilibrium (X,P) in Proposition
1. Indeed, arbitrageurs will not trade when s = 0. In the Laplacian case (s = 1), they can
exploit the pricing bias because market makers use the wrong prior. To solve the equilibrium,
I conjecture rst and verify later that arbitrageurs do not trade in the rst period, i.e.,
Z1,n = 0 for n = 1, ..., N . Under this conjecture, I solve their optimal strategy at t = 2.
Arbitrageurs anticipate the informed trader's linear strategy and the market-clearing price,





Z2,n(s̃, ỹ1) + ũ2
)
. (1.29)
They estimate ṽ based on the observed y1 and their Laplace prior L(0, ξ̃). In the
absence of model risk (i.e., ξ̃ = ξ), the n-th arbitrageur solves her optimal strategy,
Zo2,n(s = 1, y1; ξ) = arg max
z2,n
EA [(ṽ − p̃2)z2,n|I2,z] , (1.30)
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2,m be the their aggregate
trading except the n-th arbitrageur's. The rst order condition for z2,n is
EA[ṽ|I2,z]− λ1y1 = λ2
(
EA[X2|I2,z] + 2z2,n + EA[Zo2,−n|I2,z]
)
. (1.31)
Since EA[X2|I2,z] = v̂−λ1y12δλ1 where v̂ = v̂(y1; ξ) = E
A[ṽ|I2,z], the solution is














The n-th arbitrageur conjectures that every other arbitrageur solves the same problem and
trades Zo2,m = η ·(v̂−p1) for any m 6= n, with a coecient η to be solved. Eq. (1.32) becomes
Zo2,n(s = 1, y1; ξ) =
v̂ − λ1y1
4δλ1
− (N − 1)η(v̂ − λ1y1)
2













Without model risk, the optimal strategy of arbitrageurs under the Laplace prior L(0, ξ) is








































The probability density function of ỹ1 =
ṽ
ρλ1































I dene a dimensionless parameter κ ≡ ρλ1σu
ξ























which is symmetric and decays exponentially at large |y′|. Bayes' rule implies that
EA[x̃1 = x









Given that X1(v) =
v
ρλ1
, it is easy to derive the posterior expectation of ṽ explicitly:































The rescaled v̂/ξ is an increasing function of y′ with a single shape parameter κ. Asymptotic
linearity holds at |y′|  κ that v̂ → ρλ1[y1 − sign(y1)κσu]. All the second-order conditions
are easy to check. The REE corresponds to the equilibrium where all arbitrageurs have the
correct prior. Under REE, we have ξ = ξv =
σv√
2
such that the shape parameter becomes













where µ ≡ 1− 1
δ
quanties the percentage change of market depth in the second period.
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To verify that no arbitrageurs would trade in the rst period, I examine the condition
Eq. (1.6). Suppose the n-th arbitrageur deviates from the conjectured strategy by trading
a nonzero quantity Zo,d1,n = z1 6= 0 in the rst period. Then the actual total order ow at
t = 1 is ỹ′1 = x̃1 + z̃1 + ũ1, instead of ỹ1 = x̃1 + ũ1 in the conjectured equilibrium. Taking
X, P, and Zo2,m(s, y
′
1; ξ) = s
v̂(y′1)−λ1y′1
2(N+1)δλ1
for any m 6= n as given, the n-th arbitrageur's optimal
strategy at t = 2 conditional on the information set I ′2,z = {s, y1, z1} is
Zo,d2,n(s, y
′





























[v̂(y1; ξ)− v̂(y′1; ξ)]. (1.42)
If the n-th trader does not deviate from the no-trade strategy in the rst period, her
optimal strategy should be Zo2,n(s, y1; ξ) = s
v̂(y1;ξ)−λ1y1
2(N+1)δλ1
, where y1 = x1 +u1. For convenience,
we just need to consider the case s = 1. Let's add the notation that ∆P1 ≡ λ1(ỹ′1−ỹ1) = λ1z1,








∆P2 ≡ P2(X,Z′)− P2(X,Z)
= λ1z1 + λ2[∆Z +X2(ṽ, ỹ
′

















∆v̂ = −λ2∆Z, (1.43)




Since ỹ1 = X1(ṽ) + ũ1, we have E
A[ỹ1 · z1] = 0 and EA[v̂(ỹ1) · z1] = 0. The payo dierence is
∆Πdz,n = E
A[(ṽ − p̃2(X,Z′))Zo,d2,n + (ṽ − p̃1(X,Z′))z1 − (ṽ − p̃2(X,Z))Zo2,n|s̃ = 1, ξ̃ = ξ]
= EA[ṽz1 − z1p̃1(X,Z′) + ṽ∆Z −∆P2 · Zo,d2,n − p̃2(X,Z) ·∆Z|s̃ = 1, ξ̃ = ξ]
= −λ1z21 + EA[EA[(ṽ − p̃2(X,Z) + λ2Z
o,d
2,n)∆Z|ỹ1]]














− N − 1
4(N + 1)2λ2
EA [(v̂(ỹ1; ξ)− λ1ỹ1) ·∆v̂] . (1.44)
One can rewrite Eq. (1.44) in a symmetric form with respect to z1:










(N − 1)2(∆v̂)2 − (N − 1)(θ̂(ỹ1 + z1; ξ)−∆v̂)∆v̂]
4(N + 1)2λ2
. (1.45)
This is an even function of z1 because one can use the symmetry of ỹ1 and v̂(·) to prove
EA[θ̂(ỹ1 − z1; ξ) ·∆v̂(ỹ1,−z1; ξ)] = EA[θ̂(ỹ1 − z1; ξ)(v̂(ỹ1 − z1; ξ)− v̂(ỹ1; ξ))]
= EA[θ̂(−ỹ1 − z1; ξ)(v̂(−ỹ1 − z1; ξ)− v̂(−ỹ1; ξ))]
= EA[−θ̂(ỹ1 + z1; ξ)(−v̂(ỹ1 + z1; ξ) + v̂(ỹ1; ξ))] = EA[θ̂(ỹ1 + z1; ξ) ·∆v̂(ỹ1, z1; ξ)].
The rst term of Eq. (1.45) is the average cost to play z1 at t = 1, whereas the second
term represents the average prot from exploiting the biased response of other traders at
t = 2. The prot of this strategic exploitation has an upper limit which is achieved when all
the arbitrageurs have the extreme fat-tail prior ξ → ∞. In this limit, their response to the





∆Πdz,n(−z1) = ∆Πdz,n(z1), we only need to consider the positive deviation. For any z1 > 0,
∆v̂(ỹ1, z1; ξ) ≡ v̂(ỹ1 + z1; ξ)− v̂(ỹ1; ξ) ≤ ρλ1(ỹ′1 − ỹ1) = ρλ1z1, (1.46)
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where the equality holds at ξ →∞. Given that limξ→∞ θ̂(ỹ′1; ξ) = λ1(ρ− 1)(ỹ1 + z1), I nd
∆Πdz,n < lim
ξ→∞




(N − 1)2ρ2z21 − (N − 1)ρEA[((ρ− 1)(ỹ1 + z1)− ρz1)z1]
4(N + 1)2λ2
= −λ1z21 + (1− µ)λ1z21
[(N − 1)ρ+ 2]2
16(N + 1)2
(1.47)
The last expression of Eq. (1.47) is negative for any µ > µ∗(N) where µ∗(N) is the largest








1−µ . The maximum of µ
∗(N) is found to be µε ≡
limN→∞ µ
∗(N) ≈ −0.23191, which is the largest root to the cubic equation:
µ3 + 21µ2 + 35µ+ 7 = 0. (1.48)
In the liquidity regime of µ > µε ≈ −0.23191, it is indeed unprotable for any individual
arbitrageur to trade in the rst period, i.e., ∆Πdz,n(z1) < 0 for any z1 6= 0. This conrms the
no-trade conjecture at t = 1 and completes the proof of Proposition 2.
1.5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
All admissible strategies must lie in the area enclosed by Zo2,n(y1, ξ → 0), Zo2,n(y1, ξ → ∞),
and the REE asymptotes Z∞(y1, K
∗). Any strategy that runs outside this region will violate
either the asymptotic requirement or the condition of convexity/concavity preservation. By
symmetry, we just discuss the positive domain where the REE strategy is always convex. To




can never decrease in the domain of y1 > 0. With a non-decreasing rst derivative, the
admissible strategy can never go beyond the asymptote Z∞(y1, K
∗) and curve back to it.
For y1 ∈ [0, K∗], any selling decision located in the bottom triangle a would lose
money in the worst-case scenario (i.e., if the highest prior ξH is true, under which one should
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buy). Similarly, any buying decision located in the up triangle b would lose money in the
worst-case scenario (i.e., if the lowest prior ξL is true, under which one should buy). This
argument indicates a no-trade strategy over y1 ∈ [0, K∗]. For any y1 > K∗, I will prove that
any buying decision Z ′2,n(y1) located inside the area c may either lose more money or earn
less money than the buying decision Z∞(y1, K
∗) determined by the REE asymptotes. Let
Z∆ ≡ Z ′2,n(y1)− Z∞(y1, K∗). The dierence of their payos under the lowest prior ξL is
EA[∆π̃z,n|y1, ξ̃ = ξL] = EA
[(
ṽ − λ1y1 − λ2(X2 + Z ′2,n + Z2,−n + ũ2)
)
Z ′2,n
∣∣∣∣y1, ξ̃ = ξL]
−EA
[
(ṽ − λ1y1 − λ2(X2 + Z∞ + Z2,−n + ũ2))Z∞







− λ2(Z∞ + Z2,−n + ũ2)
] ∣∣∣∣y1, ξ̃ = ξL
]
− λ2Z ′2,nZ∆.(1.49)
The worst-case scenario is that ξL is true and every other arbitrageur trades Z
∞(y1, K
∗).
Let θ̂L(y1; ξL) ≡ EA[θ̃|y1, ξL] and ZL ≡ θ̂L2(N+1)λ2 . Obviously, Z
L < Z∞ < Z ′2,n and Z∆ > 0.
It is not a protable deviation for anyone to trade more than Z∞(y1, K
∗), since
EA[∆π̃z,n|y1, ξ̃ = ξL] = λ2Z∆[(N + 1)ZL − Z∞ − (N − 1)Z∞]− λ2Z ′2,nZ∆
= λ2Z∆((N + 1)Z
L −NZ∞ − Z ′2,n) < 0. (1.50)
So the robust strategy is to follow the REE asymptote, Z∞(y1, K
∗), for any y1 > K
∗.
By symmetry, the robust strategy is exactly Eq. (1.17). It remains to verify that
no arbitrageur would nd it protable to trade in the rst period, given that the other
arbitrageurs only trade at t = 2 using the same robust strategy. The proof of no-trade
condition Eq. (1.6) will be similar to the proof in Proposition 2; see Appendix 1.5.6 for more
details.
41
1.5.4 Proof of Proposition 4 and Corollary 4
Under the prior L(0, ξv), the Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) estimate of ṽ given y1 is
v̂map = arg max
v
f(v|y1) = arg max
v






















+κσusign(v). Graphically inverting this function y1(v) leads to the MAP estimator:
v̂map(y1; ξv) = sign(y1)ρλ1 max[|y1| − κσu, 0] = ρλ1 [y1 − sign(y1)κσu]1|y1|>κσu , (1.52)
which has a learning threshold κσu =
ρλσ2u
ξv
. Eq. (1.52) is also known as soft-thresholding
in statistics. This gives a Bayesian interpretation for the LASSO algorithm. LASSO has a
similar objective function that involves an l1 penalty arising from the Laplace prior. The
MAP estimate v̂map is a continuous and piecewise-linear function of y1. One can also apply
the MAP learning procedure to directly estimate the residual signal θ̃ = ṽ − p1:





(y1 − θ+λ1y1ρλ1 )
2
2σ2u





















Graphically inverting the function y1(θ) yields the MAP estimator of θ̃:














Since K∗ = ρ
ρ−1κσu > κσu, one can also write θ̂map = (v̂map − λ1y1)1|y1|>K∗ . This establishes
an observational equivalence to the robust strategy, since we nd the following identity
Z2,n(s, y1;K








Therefore, if arbitrageurs directly use the MAP rule to estimate the mispricing signal θ̃, they
will get the same strategy Z2,n(s, y1;K
∗). This MAP rule (posterior mode estimate) diers
from the posterior mean v̂(y1; ξv) which drives the REE strategy Z
o
2,n(s, y1; ξv).
Proof of Corollary 4: The MAP estimate for each asset value under the prior L(0, ξv) is:
















which amounts to the LASSO objective in the Lagrangian form for i ∈ {1, ...,M}. This leads
to the trading algorithm below, which takes the price change p1,i for each stock as input:
Z2,n(p1,i, ξv) =









where we have used Eq. (1.16) to derive λ1K
∗ =
√
2σv = 2ξv given ξv = σv/
√
2. Q.E.D.
What if arbitrageurs all adhere to the Gaussian prior? First, they will not trade if their
Gaussian prior is identical to market makers' Gaussian prior because they will nd out
the market is ecient in the semi-strong sense. Arbitrageurs only trade when they have
dierent prior beliefs. Let's model their Gaussian prior as ṽ ∼ N (0, ζ̃2), where ζ̃ is a
random variable reecting the model uncertainty about the Gaussian prior dispersion. The
assumption of prior distribution only changes how arbitrageurs learn from prices without
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aecting the informed trader's strategy by Assumption 1. For any specic value of ζ̃ = ζ,
the arbitrageurs' posterior belief about ṽ conditional on ỹ1 =
ṽ
ρλ1

















Under the Gaussian prior of ṽ, arbitrageurs believe that y1 =
ṽ
ρλ1
+ ũ1 ∼ N (0, ζ2/(ρλ1)2 +σ2u)
for a given value of ζ. By projection theorem, they obtain a linear estimator,
v̂(y1; ζ) = E








The mean of a Gaussian distribution is the same as its mode. So the MAP estimate of
ṽ coincides with the posterior mean, i.e., v̂map = v̂ in this case. The rational strategy for











, for n = 1, ..., N. (1.61)
Any uncertainty about the prior ζ only changes the slope of this linear strategy. Therefore,
the robust strategy must be linear under the max-min choice criteria.
1.5.5 Proof of Corollary 5
If arbitrageurs follow the REE strategy when s = 1, the price at t = 2 is

























= v̂ = EA[ṽ|I2,z]. (1.63)
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indicating price ineciency in the limit of N →∞.
1.5.6 Proof of Corollary 6
If arbitrageurs only trade at t = 2 and follow the robust strategy we derived, each of them





> 1 if −1 < µ < 0 and N > − 1
µ
. It may become protable for any arbitrageur
to disrupt the equilibrium by trading a large quantity, z1  K∗, in the rst period so that




trading of arbitrageurs at t = 2 can overwhelm the trade z1. This may create opportunities
for the initial instigator to unwind her position at favorable prices.
Suppose the n-th arbitrageur (instigator) secretly trades z1 6= 0 when s = 1 to trick
other traders. Her objective at t = 2 is to maximize the minimum expected prot over all
possible priors: maxz′2,n∈Z minξ∈Ω E
A[(ṽ−λ1ỹ′1−λ2ỹ′2)z′2,n|I2,z], where ỹ′1 = X1(ṽ)+z1+ũ1 and















is the total quantity traded by the other arbitrageurs (excluding the n-th one) who form the
estimate of θ̃ = ṽ−λ1y′1 based on y′1 without knowing that y′1 contains the secret trade z1. The
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instigator's estimate, θ̂map(y1) = [v̂map(y1)−λ1y1]1|y1|>K∗ = (ρ−1)λ1[y1−sign(y1)K∗]1|y1|>K∗ ,
is however based on y1 = x1 + u1 instead of y
′
1, because she is aware of the order ow z1
secretly placed by herself. The strategy of this instigator in the second period reects how
she strategically exploits the other traders' overreaction due to her trade z1:





















(N + 1)z1 + (N − 1)(ρ− 1)[z1 + (y1 −K∗)1|y1|<K∗ ]
4(N + 1)δ
,(1.66)
where we used the condition z1  K∗ so that 1|y′1=y1+z|>K∗ = 1 with probability arbitrarily
close to 1. Her expected total prot is Πdz,n = E
A[(ṽ− λ1ỹ′1)z1 + (ṽ− λ1ỹ′1 − λ2ỹ′2) ·Z ′2,n|I1,z]





z,n − EA[(ṽ − λ1ỹ1 − λ2ỹ2) · Z2,n|s̃ = 1], (1.67)
where ỹ1 = X1(ṽ)+ ũ1, ỹ2 = X2(ṽ, ỹ1)+
∑N
n=1 Z2,n(ỹ1, K




Using the results EA[ỹ1 · z1] = 0, EA[θ̂map(ỹ1) · z1] = 0 and θ̂map1|y1|<K∗ = 0, we derive that
∆Πdz,n = −λ1z21 + λ2EA[(Z ′2,n(ỹ1, z1))2]− λ2EA[(Z2,n(ỹ1, K∗))2]
= −λ1z21 + λ2EA[(Z ′2,n(ỹ1, z1) + Z2,n(ỹ1, K∗))(Z ′2,n(ỹ1, z1)− Z2,n(ỹ1, K∗))]







(N − 1)ρ+ 2
4(N + 1)
z1 +




= −λ1z21 + (1− µ)λ1z21
[




(N − 1)2(ρ− 1)2
16(N + 1)2
EA[(ỹ1 −K∗)21|ỹ1|<K∗ ].
Since δ = 1
1−µ and ρ =
3+µ
1+µ
by denition, the above expression is positive if the coecient in











Given any N > 1, there exists a critical liquidity point µ∗(N) below which ∆Πdz,n > 0.
For example, µ∗(N = 2) ≈ −0.68037, µ∗(N = 3) ≈ −0.54843, µ∗(N = 10) ≈ −0.33525,
limN→∞ µ
∗ = µε ≈ −0.23191. Thus, in the liquidity regime µ < µε ≈ −0.23191, if the num-
ber of arbitrageurs is large enough, the conjectured equilibrium Z = [〈0, Z2,1〉, ..., 〈0, Z2,N〉]




Strategic Trading with Algorithmic
Arbitrageurs
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I extend the previous model to allow for strategic interaction between the
informed trader and the group of arbitrageurs. Considering the nonlinear responses of ar-
bitrageurs, the informed trader will twist his strategy to disrupt their learning. We solve a
simplied model where arbitrageurs adhere to linear-triggering strategies and individually
choose the optimal trading thresholds. Such kinks encourage the informed trader to hide
his private signal by trading a quantity almost equal to their equilibrium threshold (under
the camouage of noise trading). This limits the amount of information revealed to his
opponents and mitigates the competitive pressure.
The informed trader entices arbitrageurs to mimic past order ows; arbitrageurs' trend-
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following responses also tempt the informed trader to trick them: she may rst trade a
large quantity to trigger those arbitrageurs and then unwind her position against them.
This strategy resembles several controversial schemes in reality. One example is momentum
ignition, a trading algorithm that attempts to trigger many other algorithmic traders to run
in the same direction so that the instigator can prot from trading against the momentum
she ignited. Another scheme is stop-loss hunting which attempts to force some traders out
of their positions by pushing the asset price to certain levels where they have set stop-loss
orders. In my setup, this sort of strategies can impair pricing accuracy, exaggerate price
volatility, and raise the average trading costs for common investors. Numerical results also
generate empirically testable patterns regarding price overreactions and volatility spikes.
This work can have multiple contributions to the literature:
First, it can help us to interpret empirical results about high-frequency traders (HFTs)1.
My primary model of statistical arbitrage can describe the situation where an informed in-
stitutional investor executed large orders over time without anticipating that HFTs detected
her footprints to catch the momentum train; see Ref. (107) for a historical account. As
an extension, I consider strategic interaction between an informed trader and a group of
arbitrageurs. This extended model can describe the situation where institutional investors
anticipate those HFTs and optimize their execution algorithms with strategic considera-
tions. My model is consistent with the empirical implications reported in Ref. (126) on
HFTs around institutional trading: (1)HFTs appear to lean against the wind when an order
starts executing but if it executes more than seven hours, they seem to reverse course and
trade with wind. (2)Institutional orders appear mostly information-motivated, in particular
1For recent research on high-frequency trading, see Ref. 75, 126, 96, and 98.
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the ones with long-lasting executions that HFTs eventually trade along with. (3)Investors
are privately informed and optimally trade on their signal in full awareness of HFTs preying
on the footprint they leave in the market.
Second, the extended model contributes to the body of literature on market manipula-
tions2. In Allen and Gale (4), a trade-based price manipulation is played by an uninformed
trader who attempts to trick other traders into believing the existence of informed trading.
In my model, the manipulative strategy is performed by an informed trader who trades in
an unexpected way to distort the learning of other traders. The informed trader may hide
her signal when it is strong and blu when it is weak. In the linear equilibrium of Foster and
Viswanathan (53), the better informed trader may also hide her information in early peri-
ods and even trade against the direction of her superior signal. 3. My analysis focuses on a
nonlinear equilibrium where the informed trader hides her information to reduce competitive
pressure from arbitrageurs. Several articles by Chakraborty and Ylmaz4 show that if market
makers face uncertainty about the existence of informed trades, then the informed trader
will blu in every equilibrium by directly adding noise to other traders' inference problem.
The disruptive strategy in my model is dierent because (1) it occurs under a set of specic
conditions, not state-by-state in every equilibrium; (2) it is a pure strategy that distorts
the learning of other traders, not a mixed strategy that adds some noise 5; (3) it produces
2See Ref. 4, 100, 87, 125, 84, 85, 95, 90, 20, 21, 103, 64, 88, 55, among many others.
3The unique linear equilibrium in Kyle (1985) model rules out a situation in which the insider can make
unbounded prots by rst destabilizing prices with unprotable trades made at the nth auction, then recouping
the losses and much more with protable trades at future auctions.
4See Ref. 25, 26, 27.
5Mixed strategies are studied in modied Kyle models; see Ref. 85 and 132 for example.
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bimodal distributions of prices, thereby magnifying both price volatility and trading costs.
Finally, the disruptive strategy in this chapter shows that asset price bubbles and
crashes can take place in a strategic environment where speculators have fat-tail beliefs.
Under good enough liquidity conditions, a better-informed savvy trader may trade very
aggressively to trigger those speculators whose subsequent momentum responses can give this
savvy trader a reversal trading opportunity. This nding is related to the literature on market
instability6. The mechanism here shares some similarity with the model of Scheinkman and
Xiong (121) where asset price bubbles reect resale options due to traders' overcondence. In
my setup, speculators' over-aggressive trading implicitly grants the informed trader a resale
option which could be exercised if condition permits. It is however worth remarking that
traders in my (extended) model share a common fat-tail prior, without any overcondence
bias.
2.2 Model
In this chapter, I extend the previous model to investigate how strategic interaction between
the informed trader and the arbitrageurs aect equilibrium outcomes. This model extension
can be interpreted as an institutional informed trader optimizes the dynamic order-execution
algorithm by taking in account the responses of algorithmic arbitrageurs who use simple
machine-learning strategies to exploit her trades. The extended model can be used, for
example, to analyze controversial issues in algorithmic trading. It can shed light on hidden
risks when algorithmic traders pervade nancial markets. Such risks may account for market
6See Ref. 104, 2, 81, and 121, among others.
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vulnerability and deserve more attention from regulators.
Let us consider a savvy informed trader who observes simultaneously the asset value ṽ
and the distribution-type signal s̃ at the beginning. She anticipates the momentum trading of
arbitrageurs and behaves strategically. In the Laplacian case, she will consider how her initial
trading aects arbitrageurs' next responses. By backward induction, her expected total prot
contains a nonlinear term reecting her consideration of arbitrageurs' nonlinear inference.
As a result, her rst-period trading strategy is no longer linear and the rational-expectations
equilibrium (REE) becomes intractable; more discussions are available in Appendix 2.5.1.
To gain insights, the analysis in this chapter is devoted to a tractable model where
strategic arbitrageurs only consider linear-triggering strategies that converge to the REE.
This model keeps the basic structure (Table 1.1) elaborated in the previous chapter. I
present a set of new assumptions to clarify traders' belief systems and information sets.
Assumption 4. As common knowledge, this market has xed linear pricing schedules, p̃1 =
P1(ỹ1) = λ1ỹ1 and p̃2 = P2(ỹ1, ỹ2) = λ1ỹ1 + λ2ỹ2, that are exogenously given by Eq. (1.9).
Assumption 5. Arbitrageurs observe s̃ and have the correct priors: N (0, σ2v) at s̃ = 0 and
L(0, ξv) at s̃ = 1. For simplicity, arbitrageurs only consider linear-triggering strategies of
the form7: Z2,n(s = 1, y1;Kn) = Z
∞(y1, ξv)1|Y1|>Kn, where Z
∞ denotes the asymptotes of
their REE strategy to be determined in the limit REE. Each arbitrageur chooses the optimal
threshold, taking as given the best responses of other arbitrageurs and the informed trader.
Assumption 6. The risk-neutral informed trader observes both ṽ and s̃ at t = 0. This
7Using linear-triggering strategies, arbitrageurs implicitly conjecture that the informed trader's strategy
increases with her private signal. However, the Bayesian-rational strategy is not necessarily monotone.
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fact and Assumption 6 are held as common knowledge among the informed trader and arbi-
trageurs. In other words, the informed trader knows everything known by the arbitrageurs,
including their prior belief and their adherence to linear-triggering strategies. Arbitrageurs
also know everything known by the informed trader except the private information ṽ.
The above assumptions put our focus on the strategic interplay between informed
trader and arbitrageurs. The linear pricing rule in Assumption 4 can hold when market
makers believe that they are living in the two-period Kyel model with the Gaussian prior
ṽ ∼ N (0, σ2v). Arbitrageurs' adherence to linear-triggering strategies in Assumption 5 is
motivated by the robust strategy discovered in Section 1.2. If traders worry about the com-
plexity or overtrading of the REE strategy, they may favor such simple algorithms. The
suggested linear-triggering strategies are determined by three parameters: slope, intercept,
and threshold. These provide well-dened trading rules amenable for computerized execu-
tions. Assumption 6 explains the savviness of this informed trader who is Bayesian-rational,
has correct knowledge about the information structure, and anticipates the strategy space
of arbitrageurs.
The timeline of this model is identical to Table 1.1, except that the informed trader ob-
serves both ṽ and s̃ at t = 0. The strategies of informed trader and arbitrageurs are denoted
byX = 〈X1, X2〉 and Z = [Z1, ...,ZN ], where Zn = 〈Z1,n, Z2,n〉 is the n-th arbitrageur's strat-
egy for n = 1, ..., N . The informed trader knows I1,x = {ṽ, s̃} before trading at t = 1 and
I2,x = {ṽ, s̃, ỹ1} before trading at t = 2. We can write x̃1 = X1(ṽ, s̃) and x̃2 = X2(ṽ, s̃, ỹ1).
Given the information sets of arbitrageurs, I1,z = {s̃} and I2,z = {s̃, ỹ1}, it is justied to
write z̃1,n = Z1,n(s̃) and z̃2,n = Z2,n(s̃, ỹ1) for n = 1, ..., N . Let π̃x =
∑2
t=1(ṽ − p̃t)x̃t be the
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informed trader's prot, and π̃z,n =
∑2
t=1(ṽ − p̃t)z̃t,n be the n-th arbitrageur's prot. It is
common knowledge that the market-clearing prices are








p̃2 = P2(ỹ1, ỹ2) = p̃1 + λ2ỹ2 = λ1ỹ1 + λ2
(
X2(s̃, ṽ, ỹ1) +
N∑
n=1
Z2,n(s̃, ỹ1) + ũ2
)
. (2.2)
To stress the dependence of prices on the strategies of traders, we write p̃t = p̃t(X,Z) for
t = 1, 2. We also write π̃x = π̃x(X,Z) and π̃z,n = π̃z,n(X,Z) because the strategy of informed
trader will aect the trading prots of arbitrageurs through direct competition and learning
interference, and arbitrageurs' strategies also aect the informed trader's prots through
competition and strategic interaction.
In this model, the informed trader and arbitrageurs have the same (consistent) belief
system. In particular, they have correct common knowledge about the mixture distribution of
ṽ. Since s̃ is observed by all of them at t = 0, the informed trader is aware of the time at which
arbitrageurs may trade. However, the informed trader cannot fool arbitrageurs into believing
a dierent type of ṽ. It is also common knowledge among them that every arbitrageur adheres
to the linear-triggering strategy with only one choice variable: the trading threshold.
Denition of Equilibrium. The equilibrium here is dened as a pair of strategies (X,Z) such
that, under the market-clearing prices Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2), the following conditions hold:
1. For any alternative strategy X′ = 〈X ′1, X ′2〉 diering from X = 〈X1, X2〉, the strategy
X yields an expected total prot no less than X′, and also X2 yields an expected prot
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in the second period no less than any single deviation X ′2:
E[π̃x(X,Z)|ṽ, s̃] ≥ E[π̃x(X′,Z)|ṽ, s̃], (2.3)
E[(ṽ − p̃2(〈X1, X2〉,Z))X2|ṽ, s̃, ỹ1] ≥ E[(ṽ − p̃2(〈X1, X ′2〉,Z))X ′2|ṽ, s̃, ỹ1] (2.4)
2. For all n = 1, ..., N and for any alternative strategy prole Z′ diering from Z only in
the n-th component Z′n = 〈Z ′1,n, Z ′2,n〉, the strategy Z yields an expected prot no less
than Z′, and also Z2,n yields an expected prot in the second period no less than Z
′
2,n:
E[π̃z,n(X,Z)|s̃] ≥ E[π̃z,n(X,Z′)|s̃], (2.5)
E[(ṽ − p̃2(·, Z2,n))Z2,n|s̃, ỹ1] ≥ E[(ṽ − p̃2(·, Z ′2,n))Z ′2,n|s̃, ỹ1]. (2.6)
The strategy prole on the right hand side of Eq. (2.6) only diers from (X,Z) at Z2,n.
In the Gaussian case, the informed trader's strategy remains the same as those in
Proposition 1; arbitrageurs nd no trading opportunity in this ecient market. To solve the
equilibrium in the fat-tail case, it is useful to conjecture rst and verify later that arbitrageurs
will not trade in the rst period. We rst solve their second-period optimal strategy under
this no-trade conjecture and then check if it is indeed unprotable for any arbitrageur to
trade in the rst period. There is another implicit conjecture in the model development. To
follow the linear-triggering strategies, arbitrageurs think that the informed trader plays a
monotone strategy which increases with her private signal. This needs to be veried too.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Equilibrium with Linear-Triggering Strategies
In the fat-tail case, large order ows at t = 1 are mostly attributable to the informed
trading. This simplies the inference problem for arbitrageurs as they can conjecture that
the informed trader's strategy is asymptotically linear:




where ρ and c are parameters to be determined in the limit equilibrium. The intercept term,




Eq. (2.7) holds, the arbitrageurs' estimate of ṽ will be asymptotically linear with the past
order ow. In Appendix 2.5.2, I solve the asymptotic X1(s = 1, v) and match the coecients
with Eq. (2.7). This yields two algebraic equations for ρ and c whose solutions are given by
ρ(µ,N) =
2 + 5N +N2 + 2µ−Nµ− (N + 2)
√




3 +N − µ−
√
N2 + (1 + µ)2 + 2N(3µ− 1)
1 +N + µ+
√




Here, the parameter ρ decreases with µ and N , because poorer liquidity or higher competitive
pressure tomorrow can stimulate more aggressive informed trading today. The parameter c
increases (with µ) from −1 to 0, because poor future liquidity tends to discourage strategic
actions; as shown in Appendix 2.5.3, this parameter reects the extent of how the informed
trader strategically exploits the estimation bias of arbitrageurs. These two parameters can
determine the REE asymptotes, Z∞, which helps us to pin down the following equilibrium.
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Proposition 6. In the liquidity regime of µ > µε where µε ≈ 0.005 according to numerical
results, the following equilibrium (X,Z) holds. First, arbitrageurs do not trade in the rst
period, i.e., Z1,n = 0 for n = 1, ..., N . Their optimal linear-triggering strategy at t = 2 is
Z2,n(s, y1;K




























For the informed trader, the equilibrium strategy at t = 2 is to trade
X2(v, s, y1;K






The strategy at t = 1 is monotone with her signal, given by Eq. (2.61) in Appendix 2.5.4.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.4.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: The threshold K∗(µ,N) and the strategy Z2,n(s, y1;K
∗) in two liquidity regimes.
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Corollary 7. The linear-triggering strategy Eq. (2.10) implies the heuristic learning rule,
θ̂T = s · (v̂T − λ1y1)1|y1|>K∗, which estimates θ̃ = ṽ − p1, with
v̂T (y1; ξv) = ρλ [y1 − sign(y1)(1 + c)κσu]1|y1|>κσu . (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.4 as well.
The learning rule v̂T looks similar to the MAP estimator v̂map in Eq. (1.19), except





is independent of the parameter c, because parallel shifts of the informed trading strategy
do not change the signal-to-noise ratio perceived by arbitrageurs. This learning threshold
depends on the parameter ρ, because more aggressive informed trading (smaller ρ) can make
arbitrageurs learn faster (smaller κσu). The overall learning rule, θ̂T (y1;K
∗), is governed by
the threshold K∗, which is the maximum of learning threshold κσu and strategic intercept
term ρ(1+c)κσu
ρ−1 . Since this intercept increases (with µ) from 0 to 2κσu, it must cross κσu at
some intermediate value of µ. This indicates a kink in the equilibrium threshold:
Corollary 8. There are two liquidity regimes separated by the critical liquidity value
µc(N) =
√








For µ ∈ [0, µc], Z2,n(s, y1;K∗) is discontinuous at |y1| = K∗ = κσu which decreases with µ.
For µ ∈ [µc, 1], Z2,n(s, y1;K∗) is continuous and has K∗ = ρ(1+c)ρ−1 κσu which increases with µ.
Proof. The critical liquidity µc is set by substituting the expressions of ρ and c, Eq. (2.8)
and Eq. (2.9), into the crossover condition 1 = ρ(1+c)
ρ−1 or 1 + ρc = 0.
Corollary 8 suggests that K∗ = κσu for any µ < 3
√
3 − 5 and K∗ = ρ(1+c)
ρ−1 κσu for
µ > 0.5. The rescaled threshold K∗/σu only depends on the liquidity level µ and the
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competition condition N (Fig. 2.1). This threshold ensures that the algorithmic strategy
Z2,n only performs momentum trading. Under good liquidity µ ∈ [0, µc], the equilibrium
threshold is set by the learning hurdle of v̂T , i.e., K
∗ = κσu. Traders who use a threshold
lower than κσu may engage in unjustied trading for a range of states where their estimated
signal v̂T is zero. Under poor liquidity µ ∈ [µc, 1], the equilibrium threshold is set by the
horizontal intercept of θ̂T , i.e., K
∗ = ρ(1+c)
ρ−1 κσu. Traders who use a threshold lower than
this may do contrarian trading for a range of states where their estimated residual signal θ̂T
is zero. Arbitrageurs will keep undercutting their thresholds as far as possible8 until they












Figure 2.2: The slope and intercept of Z2(y1) =
∑N
n=1 Z2,n(s = 1, y1;K
∗) as a function of µ.
8As long as the informed trader's strategy monotonically increases with her signal, it will be protable
for arbitrageurs to undercut the threshold as much as possible.
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As shown in Fig. 2.2, the total arbitrage trading Z2(y1) ≡
∑N




, which decreases from 1 to 0 as µ varies from 0 to 1. Its horizontal inter-
cept, ρ(1+c)
ρ−1 κσu, increases from 0 to 2
√
2σu. At constant market depth, the total arbitrage
trading collapses to the 45◦ line, limµ→0 Z2 = y11|y1|>κσu , regardless of the number N . This
is an order-ow mimicking strategy, since the total quantity traded by arbitrageurs exactly
mimics the total order ow they observed earlier. Also, this is like a pool of stop-loss orders








either direction. A function of the form, F (y) = y1|y|>K , is often called hard-thresholding
in machine learning. For µ > 0.5, arbitrageurs always use the soft-thresholding strategy.
After observing the total order ow y1, the informed trader can gure out whether
arbitrageurs will be triggered or not given their threshold K∗. This allows him to solve
X2(v, y1, K
∗) from Eq. (2.12). Using backward induction, he needs to decide x1 = X1(v,K
∗)
by carefully evaluating how his trade aects the probability of triggering those arbitrageurs
who may compete with him: Q∗(x1) = E
[
1|ỹ1|>K∗ |X1(v,K∗) = x1
]
.
Let's look at the strategy of informed trader in dierent liquidity regimes. If market
liquidity at t = 2 is good (µ < µc), her initial strategy X1(s = 1, v;K
∗) is bended toward
K∗ to distort arbitrageurs' learning [Fig. 2.3(a)]. With x̃1 ≈ K∗ for a range of ṽ, it will be
dicult for arbitrageurs to infer the strength of ṽ from ỹ1 = x̃1 + ũ1. Their trading decisions
are error-prone because they are largely inuenced by noise trading ũ1. The nonlinear pure
strategy allows the informed trader to hide her signal temporarily and inhibit the response of
arbitrageurs. This strategy distorts the learning of arbitrageurs and twists their responses.














Figure 2.3: (a) the informed trader's strategy X1(s = 1, v) under dierent µ. (b) the total
payos to arbitrageurs in two models under respective linear-triggering strategies.
(µ > µc), the informed trader will trade more at t = 1 and play the game more honestly.
Poor liquidity discourages the informed trader's manipulative trading. Fig. 2.3(a) conrms
that when the signal is suciently strong, the informed trader ultimately shifts his strategy
to the conjectured asymptotic line: X1(v)→ vρλ1 ± cκσu. It is costly to hide a strong signal,
especially when future liquidity is poor. That is why X1(v) is increasingly aligned with the
linear strategy as µ increases. Overall, the informed trader induces arbitrageurs to trade
more competitively. This disrupts the cartel eect we discussed in the previous chapter9.
Facing the savvy informed trader, arbitrageurs can no longer sustain extra market power
nor earn noncompetitive prots at large N [Fig. 2.3(b)].
9If we introduce a Bayesian-rational arbitrageur into the group of arbitrageurs who all play the linear-
triggering strategy, this rational trader will disrupt their tacit collusion and make the market more com-
petitive. The informed trader here plays a similar role because he disrupts the would-be collusive group.
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2.3.2 Disruptive Strategies and Price Manipulations
In this trading game with linear-triggering strategies, there is an implicit belief in the ar-
bitrageurs' minds that the informed trader will play a monotone strategy which increases
with her signal. Numerically, this conjecture is found to hold in the liquidity regime where
µ > µε ≈ 0.005. However, the conjectured equilibrium becomes unstable when market depth
is almost constant (µ → 0). If µ is arbitrarily close to 0, arbitrageurs' trading will closely
mimic the order ow y1. This may invite the informed trader to trick them.
Let's consider the limiting case where v → 0 and µ→ 0: the informed trader receives
a non-directional signal about the asset value and also anticipates that the total order ow
from arbitrageurs is limµ→0 Z
AT
2 (y1) = y11|y1|>κσu . How will the informed trader trade if he
knows that other traders will mimic the observed order ow once they get triggered?















Here, we set σu = 1 and use φ(·) to denote the probability density of a standard Gaus-
sian distribution. The informed trader will rst trade a suciently large x1 to trigger ar-
bitrageurs10 and then trade x2 = −y1 to oset their subsequent momentum trading, i.e.,
limµ→0X2(v = 0, y1) = −y1 = − limµ→0 Z2(y1). This Bayesian-rational strategy has a termi-
nal position of x1 + x2 = −u1 which is zero on average, with an expected prot of λ1σ2u.
10There may exist multiple solutions to Eq. (2.15): one is obviously x1 = 0 and the other two solutions
are ±∞ which lead to the global maximum prot. As long as the informed trader chooses a large enough x1
(instead of ±∞), the probability of triggering arbitrageurs can be arbitrarily close to one and his expected




Proof. This rational strategy follows from Eq. (2.10) and Eq. (2.12) by taking both limits
v → 0 and µ→ 0. Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix 2.5.5.
𝑣 𝑣
(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: (a) the optimal strategy of informed trader under µ = 10−4, N = 3 and ξv = 3.
(b) the total payos to dierent groups of traders.
As shown in Fig. 2.4(a), when the private signal v is very small, the informed trader
places a large order |x1|  K∗ = κσu to trigger arbitrageurs whose trading at t = 2
closely mimics the total order ow observed at t = 1. This allows the informed trader to
liquidate most of her inventory at more favorable prices at t = 2. The terminal position
E[x̃1 + x̃2|ṽ = v] is almost linear with her private signal v, but her strategy in each period
is non-monotone with her signal. Fig. 2.4(b) shows the total payos to dierent groups
of traders. Arbitrageurs incur dramatic losses near the origin as they have been fooled by























𝜇 = 10-4 𝜇 = 10-4
Figure 2.5: The unconditional probability distributions of the prices p̃1 and p̃2 under the
non-monotone strategy versus the monotone strategy, given µ = 10−4, N = 3 and σv = 3
√
2.
The non-monotone strategy seems disruptive and resembles controversial strategies
in the real world, including momentum ignition and stop-loss hunting. These schemes are
usually regarded as trade-based price manipulations by regulators. If such non-monotone
strategies are prohibited (by regulators) in the model, the informed trader at the state
v = 0 will not trade at t = 1. Instead, she will watch the market rst and trade at
t = 2 against either the noise-driven price changes or the order ows from arbitrageurs
who are falsely triggered. Kyle and Viswanathan (103) recommend two economic criteria
for regulators to dene illegal price manipulations. These are pricing accuracy and market
liquidity. Fig. 2.5 compares the (unconditional) probability distributions of prices when
the non-monotone strategy is allowed or banned. With the non-monotone strategy in Fig.
2.4(a), price distributions are bimodal in both periods [Fig. 2.5(a)]. Pricing accuracy is
poor as prices do not reect the fundamental value ṽ (with a unimodal distribution). Price
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volatilities are at least twice as large as the fundamental volatility σv. If a common investor
arrives and trades this asset, she is likely to buy at a much higher ask price or sell at a
much lower bid price. The bimodal price pattern reects a much wider bid-ask spread for
common investors. In contrast, if regulators set rules to ban such disruptive strategies, the
price distributions become bell-shaped in both periods with reasonable price volatilities and
pricing accuracy [Fig. 2.5(b)].
Regulators need to sort out the economic conditions for the trade-base manipulations.
The results in this chapter prescribe a list of conditions that could be necessary for the
non-monotone disruptive strategy.
(1) Speculators think that market makers set inaccurate prices by using incorrect priors.
(2) Speculators have fat-tail priors about the fundamental value or trading opportunities.
(3) There is strategic interplay between the informed trader and those speculators.
(4) Market depth is not decreasing when the informed trader liquidates her inventory.
(5) Traders face no trading costs, no inventory costs, nor threat from regulators.
(6) There is no other informed trader who could interfere with the disruptive strategy.
The (non-monotone) disruptive strategy may fail if any of these conditions is not
satised. It seems not easy at all, but the key condition is that the total feedback trading from
speculators has a slope no less than one. This could happen if speculators underestimate the
actual number of speculators (N), since each speculator's demand is inversely proportional
to the number of competitors (estimated by the speculator). This could also happen in the
liquidity regime with µ < 0, where the informed trader could dump her early inventory at
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a lower cost and speculators may trade more aggressively. In the conjectured equilibrium,
the response slope of each speculator is given by (1−µ)(ρ−1)
N+2
. If all speculators keep using
this strategy in the liquidity regime µ < 0, the slope of their aggregate response will be
greater than one: N (1−µ)(ρ−1)
N+2
> 1. Over-trading makes speculators susceptible to disruptive
attacks. For the informed trader, the prots of tricking speculators can be outweighed by
the losses if she fails to liquidate the undesirable inventory in the second period.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider a model of strategic trading between informed trader and algo-
rithmic arbitrageurs. It is shown that the informed trader will try to distort arbitrageurs'
learning and induce them to trade more aggressively. Under certain market conditions, the
informed trader may play a disruptive strategy that resembles real-life controversial prac-
tices (e.g., momentum ignition in high frequency trading). Such trading schemes can distort
the informational content of prices and destabilize stock prices at the expense of common
investors. This model can provide policy implications and empirical predictions.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Nonlinear Rational-Expectations Equilibrium
For s = 1, we investigate the rational-expectations equilibrium (REE) in the model of savvy
informed trader who anticipates arbitrageurs and strategically interacts with them. Based
on I2,x = {v, s, y1}, the informed trader conjectures her residual demand at t = 2 and solves
X2(v, y1) = arg max
x2






As the informed trader takes into account the price impact of all arbitrageurs, she will reduce
her trading quantity by one half of the total arbitrage trading that she expects at t = 2.
The information set of arbitrageurs right after t = 1 is I2,z = {s, y1}, which is nested into
the informed trader's information set I2,x = {v, s, y1}. The n-th arbitrageur's objective is
max
z2,n
E [z2,n (ṽ − λ1ỹ1 − λ2 [X2(ṽ, ỹ1) + z2,n + Z2,−n(ỹ1) + ũ2]) |I2,z] , (2.17)
from which she can solve the optimal strategy as below









Arbitrageurs are symmetric in terms of their information and objectives. The n-th arbi-
trageur conjectures that the other arbitrageurs will trade Z2,m = η ·(v̂−λ1y1) form = 1, ..., N
and m 6= n, and she also conjectures the informed trader's conjecture that all arbitrageurs











(v̂ − λ1y1). (2.19)
In a symmetric equilibrium, every arbitrageur conjectures in the same way and solves the


















One can prove a simple result that Z2,n = E[X2|I2,z], i.e., every arbitrageur expects that the















As v̂ = E[ṽ|I2,z], we obtain the following
Z2,n(y1) = η(v̂ − λ1y1) =
1− µ
(N + 2)λ1





















· v − v̂
2λ2
, (2.24)
where the rst term is proportional to her informational advantage over market makers
and the second term is proportional to her residual advantage over arbitrageurs. In the
competitive case (N →∞), there are two simple results
lim
N→∞

























The informed trader's expected prot from her second-period trading is









The informed trader needs to choose x1 that maximizes her total expected prots:
Πx(v) = max
x1
E [x1(v − λ1ỹ1) + Π2,x(v, ỹ1)|I1,x]
= max
x1










where I1,x = {v, s = 1}. As regularity conditions permit, one can interchange expectation
and dierentiation operations to derive the rst order condition (FOC) for x1 = X1(v):





(N + 2)v −Ng(x1 + ũ1)− 2λ1(x1 + ũ1)
2(N + 2)
· Ng





When s = 1, there does not exist a linear REE where the informed trader's strategy X1
is a linear function of v. This is proved by contradiction: Suppose X1 is a linear function of
v, the posterior mean g(y1) = E[ṽ|I2,z] will be a nonlinear function of y1. With a nonlinear
g(y1), the FOC Eq. (2.29) does not permit a linear solution to X1(v). Nonlinearity makes
Eq. (2.29) and the REE intractable in general.
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2.5.2 Asymptotic Linearity
Based on the asymptotic conjecture of X1(v) → vρλ1 + cκσu in the high signal regime, arbi-















At large order ows, it is deduced that E[x̃1|y1]→ y1 − κσu and furthermore
E[ṽ|I2,z]→ ρλ1[y1 − (1 + c)κσu]. (2.31)
This result makes the informed trader's FOC Eq. (2.29) for x1 = X1(v) linear again:












After some calculation with the notation δ ≡ λ2
λ1
= 1
1−µ , we get
0 = v − 2λ1x1 −
Nρ+ 2
2δ(N + 2)2
[(N + 2)v − (Nρ+ 2)λ1x1 +N(1 + c)κρλ1σu] . (2.33)
This FOC leads to a linear expression of x1 which conforms to the original linear conjecture:
X1(v) =
(N + 2)[2δ(N + 2)−Nρ− 2]





− Nρ(Nρ+ 2)(1 + c)κ
4δ(N + 2)2 − (Nρ+ 2)2
σu. (2.34)
Matching the rst term leads to a quadratic equation for ρ:
− 2(ρ− 1)(Nρ+ 2) + 2δ(ρ− 2)(N + 2)2 = 0. (2.35)
There are two roots to this equation but only one of them is sensible as it increases with δ:
ρ(δ,N) =
N + δ(N + 2)2 − 2− (N + 2)
√




Substituting δ = 1
1−µ into the above equation leads to
ρ(µ,N) =
2 + 5N +N2 + 2µ−Nµ− (N + 2)
√
N2 + (1 + µ)2 + 2N(3µ− 1)
2N(1− µ)
. (2.37)
For N = 0, we have ρ = 3+µ
1+µ
which is identical to the parameter ρ in the previous model.





In the competitive case, we have limN→∞ ρ = 2. Intuitively, the informed trader would
only trade half of his private signal when he expected a competitive fringe of arbitrageurs.





and limµ→1 ρ = 2. This equilibrium





. Now we match
the intercept terms and utilize the slope-matching relation to obtain
c = − N(2 +Nρ)
2δ(2 +N)2 − 2(2 +Nρ)
= −
3 +N − µ−
√
N2 + (1 + µ)2 + 2N(3µ− 1)
1 +N + µ+
√










2δ(2 +N)2 − 2(2 + 2N)
= −1
δ
= −(1− µ). (2.39)
There are two more useful limits: limµ→0 c = −1 and limµ→1 c = 0.
Approximation to the rational equilibrium. The symmetry indicates that X1(−v) = −X1(v).
If X1(v) is monotone, it should cross the origin and be roughly linear in that neighborhood.
With the linearized conjecture X1(v → 0)→ vαλ1 , one can use Taylor expansion of Eq. (1.14)
at small y1 to approximate E[ṽ|y1  κσu] ≈ αβλ1y1, where α and β are determined by






























The rst equation is derived from the FOC Eq. (2.29) and the second one is from the Taylor
expansion of Eq. (1.14). Given {µ,N, ξ}, one can numerically nd a unique pair of positive
solutions to α and β. With constant depth (µ = 0), the rst equation becomes α = 2(N+3)
N+2−Nβ
and the total demand from arbitrageurs becomes limµ→0 Z2 ≈ limµ→0 N(αβ−1)N+2 y1 = (α −
3)y1 for small y1. The rational equilibrium is not tractable, but one can approximate the
arbitrageurs' rational strategy by smoothly pasting the two regimes of asymptotic linearity.
There are dierent methods to make a smooth transition between two linear segments; for
example, any sigmoid functions that approach the Heaviside function may work. Here, I use
q(y) = 1
2
erfc[a(κσu−y)]+ 12erfc[a(κσu+y)], with a tunable parameter a > 0 and approximate
the posterior mean estimate of ṽ by
v̂a(y1) ≈ [1− q(y1)]αβλ1y1 + q(y1)ρλ1[y1 − sign(y1)(1 + c)κσu]. (2.40)
Clearly, v̂a → αβλ1y1 at |y1|  κσu and v̂a → ρλ1[y1 − sign(y1)(1 + c)κσu] at |y1|  κσu.
The gure below shows numerical approximations to the Bayesian-rational strategy Zo2,n(s =






































Figure 2.6: Approximate rational strategies and the linear-triggering strategy (red line).
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2.5.3 Learning Bias and Strategic Informed Trading
Corollary 10. Arbitrageurs tend to underestimate the private signal ṽ by a negative amount
−ρκλ1σu < 0. Anticipating this estimation bias, the informed trader in the high signal regime
will strategically shift her demand downward by an amount of cκσu < 0 at t = 1 and upward
by an amount of dκσu > 0 at t = 2 where the parameter d(µ,N) is given by Eq. (2.45). her
average terminal position contains an informational component and a strategic component,
that is, E[X1(v) +X2(v, ũ1)]→ X∗inf (v) +X∗str, where X∗str = (c+ d)κσu and
X∗inf =





Given any N > 0, the maximum of X∗inf (v) is at µc(N) =
√
N(N + 2)3 −N(N + 3)− 1.
Proof: In the asymptotic rational equilibrium we have shown E[ṽ|I2,z]→ ρλ1[y1−(1+c)κσu]
and y1 = X1(v) + ũ1 → (ρλ1)−1ṽ + cκσu + ũ1. Arbitrageurs tend to underestimate ṽ,
E[ṽ|I2,z]− ṽ = −ρλ1κσu + ρλ1ũ1 ∼ N [−ρλ1κσu, (ρλ1σu)2], (2.42)
which has a negative mean −ρλ1κσu < 0. This learning bias of arbitrageurs entices the
informed trader to strategically exploit it. This can be seen from her asymptotic strategy:










whose average contains both an informational component and a strategic one:













1 +N + µ+
√
N2 + (1 + µ)2 + 2N(3µ− 1)
. (2.45)
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It has the following limit results: limµ→0 d = 1, limµ→1 d = 0, and limN→∞ d = 1− µ. Thus,




d > 0. This shows how the informed trader strategically exploit the arbitrageurs' bias κσu.
The asymptotic terminal position of the informed trader can be decomposed into an infor-
mational term and a strategic term, that is, E[X1(v) + X2(v, ũ1)] → X∗inf (v) + X∗str where













1 + 3N + µ−
√





which is hump-shaped and reaches its maximum at
µc(N) =
√
N(N + 2)3 −N(N + 3)− 1. (2.47)
For example, X∗inf has its maximum 0.5359
v
λ1
atN = 1 and µc(N = 1) = 3
√
3−5 = 0.196152.
The informed trader manages to reach an informational target position roughly equal to v
2λ1
.
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2.5.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The candidate linear-triggering strategy for each arbitrageur along the REE asymptotes is












For s = 1, this can be rewritten as
Z2,n(s, y1;Kn) =
ρλ1[y1 − sign(y1)(1 + c)κσu]− λ1y1
(N + 2)λ2
1|y1|>Kn
= η · [v̂T (y1; ξv)− λ1y1]1|y1|>Kn , (2.49)
where η = 1−µ
(N+2)λ1
and the implied learning rule for ṽ is
v̂T (y1; ξv) = ρλ [y1 − sign(y1)(1 + c)κσu]1|y1|>κσu . (2.50)
The learning threshold κσu here ensures that v̂T takes the same sign as y1.








Intuitively, any trader choosing Kn lower than the learning threshold κσu may take actions
to trade over the states |y1| ∈ [Kn, κσu] where she actually learns nothing under her learning
rule, i.e., v̂T = 0 for |y1| ∈ [Kn, κσu]. To exclude irrational trading when the inferred signal is
zero, the equilibrium threshold must have a lower bound κσu. On the other hand, any trader
choosing Kn lower than the intercept
ρ(1+c)κσu
ρ−1 may trade against the price trend (contrarian






. This may go against the true (fat-tail) signal








arbitrageurs dedicate to the momentum trading strategy which is desirable in our fat-tail
setup. When traders choose thresholds, they actually engage in Bertrand-type competition:
each of them will keep undercutting the threshold as long as it is more protable than the
case she follows the common threshold used by other traders. Under this competition, the
equilibrium threshold is the boundary K∗ given by Eq. (2.51).
Let's rst show that to use any threshold K ′ lower than K∗ cannot be an equilibrium.
It suces to show that when everyone else uses K−n = K
′ < K∗, it is a protable deviation
for the n-th trader to choose Kn = K
∗. We need to compare the dierence of expected
prots:
E [π̃z,n(ỹ1;Kn = K
∗, K−n = K







− λ1η(N − 2)
2(1− µ)
)











+ (v̂ − v̂T )Θ
]
1K′<|y1|<K∗ , (2.52)
where Θ = v̂T − λ1y1 is negative for K ′ < y1 < K∗ and positive for K ′ < −y1 < K∗.
For the case K∗ = κσu, we have v̂T = 0 but v̂ ≥ 0 for |y1| ∈ [K ′, κσu]. It means the last
expression of Θ is a parabola that opens downward and crosses the origin. Since Θ takes
the opposite sign of y1 and v̂ for K
′ < |y1| < K∗, the last expression is strictly positive for
K ′ < |y1| < K∗. Similar arguments can be applied to the case K∗ = ρ(1+c)κσuρ−1 . Therefore,
E [π̃z,n(ỹ1;Kn = K
∗, K−n = K
′)− π̃z,n(ỹ1;Kn = K ′, K−n = K ′)] > 0 for K ′ < K∗, i.e., any
threshold less than K∗ cannot be an equilibrium threshold.
Similarly, any threshold K ′ larger than K∗ cannot be an equilibrium threshold either.
As before, it suces to show that the deviation is protable for any trader by just choosing
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Kn = K
∗ less than K ′ used by others. The payo dierence given y1 is positive as well:
E [π̃z,n(ỹ1;Kn = K
∗, K−n = K
















Θ2 + (v̂ − v̂T )Θ
]
1K∗<|y1|<K′ > 0. (2.53)
It rules out any threshold larger than K∗ to be an equilibrium. So the only possible equilib-
rium choice is K∗. When every trader uses the same threshold K∗, no one will deviate.
𝜇 = 0, 𝜉 = 2
 𝑣 𝐴
𝑇
“Hard Thresholding” AlgorithmNo Profitable Unilateral Deviation
(𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡: 𝜅𝜎)
Figure 2.8: Left: Trading prots if someone deviates from K∗. Right: Learning rule v̂T (y1).
Now look at the informed trader in this algorithmic trading game. If arbitrageurs all
use the same threshold K (which can be general), the informed trader at t = 2 will trade
X2(v, y1;K) = (1− µ)
v − λ1y1
2λ1










and pick X1(v,K) that maximizes her total payo. The price at t = 2 can be written as
p̃2 = λ1y1 + λ2
(






+ λ2ũ2, if |y1| > K
ṽ+λ1y1
2
+ λ2ũ2, if |y1| < K,
(2.55)
depending on whether the arbitrageurs are triggered. It is interesting to notice that the





Nλ1[(ρ− 1)y1 − sign(y1)ρ(1 + c)κσu]
2(N + 2)
1|y1|>K . (2.56)
We have limµ→0 E[P2|v, y1] = v+λ1y12 +
λ1y11|y1|>K
2
≤ λ1y1 + v2 , which means the average price
change at t = 2 is at most half of the fundamental value when market depth is constant.
The informed trader's expected prot in the second period is also contingent on the state of
arbitrageurs:















, if |y1| < K.
(2.57)
Note that her expected prot in the second period is always positive because the informed
trader fully anticipates the response of arbitrageurs. The informed trader needs to determine
x1 = X1(v;K) that maximizes the total expected prot from both periods. The calculation
of her total prot, conditional on the private signal v, can be decomposed into three terms:




Π1,x + Π2,x1|ỹ1|<K + Π2,x1|ỹ1|>K |I1,x
]
= x1(v − λ1x1) + E
[










On one hand, the informed trader may want to trade less to avoid triggering arbitrageurs
and take full advantage of her information at t = 2. On the other hand, it is costly to hide
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her private signal if it is strong. This trade-o will reect in the relative values of Π−2,x and
Π+2,x which are dened below. Hereafter, I set σu = 1 for convenience. By direct integration,










(1− µ)[2v − λ1(K + x1)]φ(K − x1)
4
− (1− µ)[2v + λ1(K − x1)]φ(K + x1)
4
+


























































denotes the probability density function of the standard normal distribution (with σu = 1).
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Taking the rst derivative, dΠx
dx1
= 0, one can nd the FOC for X1(v;K) = x1:
0 = v − 2λ1x1 −














(1− µ)[(v − λ1K)2 + 2λ21]
4λ1
[φ(K + x1)− φ(K − x1)] + (1− µ)Kvφ(K + x1)
+
(1− µ)φ(K − x1)
4λ1(N + 2)2
{[Kλ1(Nρ+ 2)− (N + 2)v]2 + 2λ21(Nρ+ 2)2
+λ1wNρ[λ1wNρ− 2Kλ1(Nρ+ 2) + 2(N + 2)v]}
−(1− µ)φ(K + x1)
4λ1(N + 2)2
{[Kλ1(Nρ+ 2) + (N + 2)v]2 + 2λ21(Nρ+ 2)2
+λ1wNρ[λ1wNρ− 2Kλ1(Nρ+ 2)− 2(N + 2)v]}
−(1− µ)(Nρ+ 2)
4(N + 2)2













This FOC equation denes the informed trader's optimal strategy X1 = x1(v;K) at t = 1.
The unconditional expected total prot of all arbitrageurs Πtotz ≡ E
[∑N
n=1 π̃z,n(ṽ, ũ1, ũ2)
]
=




















[wλ1ρ(2Nρ+ 2−N)− (ρ− 1)((N + 2)v − λ1(Nρ+ 2)(x1 −K))]φ(K + x1)
− N(1− µ)
4(N + 2)2
[(N + 2)v(ρ(w − x1) + x1) + λ1Nρ2(1 + (w − x1)2)








[(N + 2)v(ρ(w + x1)− x1)− λ1Nρ2(1 + (w + x1)2)

























2.5.5 Proof of Corollary 9






















{[φ(K − x1) + φ(K + x1)]K + [φ(K − x1)− φ(K + x1)]x1},(2.64)

































which may have multiple solutions: one is obviously x1 = 0 and the other two are ±∞.
As long as the informed trader trades a suciently large quantity x1  κ (instead of
±∞), the probability of triggering arbitrageurs to trade is arbitrarily close to one. In the
second period, the informed trader's optimal strategy is found to be limµ→0X2(v = 0, y1) =
−y1, which exactly osets the total quantity traded by arbitrageurs limµ→0 Z2(y1) = y1.
Thus, the terminal position of the informed trader is x1 +x2 = −u1 which is zero on average.
The expected prot from this disruptive strategy is found to be Πx ≈ λ1σ2u, which is limited
by the noise trading volatility in the rst period.
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2.5.6 Economic Conditions for Trade-Based Manipulations
The disruptive strategy by the savvy informed trader involves three key conditions:
(1) Speculators think that market makers set inaccurate prices by using incorrect priors.
(2) Speculators have fat-tail priors about the fundamental value or trading opportunities.
(3) There is strategic interaction between the informed trader and those speculators.
First, if speculators (arbitrageurs) trust in market eciency, they will not trade in
a market where they have no superior information. Moreover, for any trader to play the
disruptive strategy, she needs to know that the asset liquidation value will not deviate from
its initial price (i.e. v ≈ 0). The third condition emphasizes the strategic interaction between
the informed trader and the group of less-informed speculators. The informed trader can
twist her strategy to induce more aggressive trading by speculators.
Now we discuss the second condition. If speculators have the Gaussian prior instead
of the fat-tail prior, they can conjecture a linear equilibrium where the informed trader's
strategy X1(v) is a linear function and arbitrageurs' strategy Z2,n(y1) is also linear with y1
for n = 1, ..., N . With the conjecture X1 =
v
ρλ1
, arbitrageurs' posterior expectation becomes




2 . Substituting this linear estimator into the informed
trader's FOC (still Eq. 2.29) yields










from which on can solve
x1 =
2λ1(N + 2)
2 − (1− µ)(N + 2)(NA+ 2λ1)
4λ21(N + 2)
2 − (1− µ)(NA+ 2λ1)2
v. (2.68)
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2 − (1− µ)(N + 2)(NA(ρ) + 2λ1)
4λ21(N + 2)
2 − (1− µ)(NA(ρ) + 2λ1)2
. (2.69)
One has to solve a quintic11 equation of ρ which can be done numerically given {µ,N, λ1}.
With the Gaussian prior, the optimal strategies for arbitrageurs are always linear, with a
response slope less than one. The informed trader's strategy is also linear. As an example,
let's consider the simple case of σv =
3√
2
, σu = 1, and µ = 0 in the limit N →∞. Eq. (2.69)
becomes −4 + 2ρ− 18ρ4
(2ρ2+9)2
= 0, where the unique real solution turns out to be ρ = 3.
Back to the model with fat-tail prior, both Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4 demonstrate the
importance of the relative liquidity condition at t = 2. The informed trader's strategy X1(v)
is always a monotone and increasing function of v in the liquidity regime µ > µε where
µε ≈ 0.005 according to numerical experiments. The presence of trading costs and/or inven-
tory holding costs will erode the nite prots earned by the disruptive strategy. Potential
punishment by regulators plays a similar role to discourage disruptive trading. Moreover, if
there are two informed traders in the market and both of them know v ≈ 0, then neither of
them would play the non-monotone disruptive strategy. This is intuitive: if one of them had
engaged in aggressive trading (to entice other speculators), then the other informed trader
would trade against her in the second stage so that the initial instigator could not fully
liquidate the inventory. The above arguments explain the other conditions in the main text.
(4) Market depth is not decreasing when the informed trader liquidates her inventory.
(5) Traders face no trading costs, no inventory costs, nor threat from regulators.
(6) There is no other informed trader who could interfere with the disruptive trading scheme.
11A quintic equation is dened by a polynomial of degree ve.
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In fact, if speculators (arbitrageurs) restrict themselves to convex strategies, their





. In this case, their total order ow is limµ→0 Z
conv
2 (y1) = y1 and the best response of in-
formed trader at t = 1 becomes monotone again.
Finally, I report the expected price trajectories contingent on whether the speculators
with linear-triggering strategies are triggered or not. The gure below shows the sample path
of prices which can overshoot or undershoot depending on whether speculator are triggered.
The price pattern at µ = 0 shown in the left panel exhibits the bubble and crash of asset
prices. The clustering of prices in the right panel illustrates how the informed trader hides
her private signal in the rst period to inhibit the inference and response of speculators.






























What if the Long Forward Rate is Flat?
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies several fundamental issues regarding long-run asset pricing and interest
rate modeling. Hansen and Scheinkman (70) employ the advanced semigroup approach
to develop the permanent-transitory decomposition of the pricing kernel in a frictionless,
Markovian economy. Their result is of great interest for the long-term asset valuation and
risk management, with many implications for macro-nance studies as well. The present
article employs the martingale approach to give a simple proof for the Hansen-Scheinkman
decomposition under the economic condition that the long forward rate is constant. When
the long-maturity bond is taken as the numeraire, an explicit expression is derived for the
permanent martingale component as it denes the change of probabilities to the long forward
measure. This permanent martingale is shown to covary with the transitory component,
consistent with empirical ndings. This work further identies a strong restriction in a class
of term structure models and compares dierent approaches of interest rate modeling.
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In nancial markets that admit no arbitrage, the price of an asset today is determined
by taking the expectation of future cash ows discounted by a strictly positive stochastic
discount factor (SDF) which is also known as the pricing kernel (118, 49). The concept
of risk-neutral probability is introduced by Cox and Ross (36) and is further developed by
Harrison and Kreps (73). The SDF for risk-neutral pricing is a product of the risk-free
discounting factor and a positive martingale component that encodes the risk premium and
denes a change of measure from the physical probability to the risk neutral probability
(under which future cash ows can be discounted by the risk-free rate). This SDF decom-
position is widely used but not unique. For example, one can also choose the T -maturity
zero-coupon bond as the numeraire so that the SDF contains a new martingale component
which denes the change of probabilities to the T -forward measure absolutely continuous
with respect to the risk-neutral measure. This approach was pioneered by Jamshidian (86)
as a useful means for bond option pricing. Under the forward measure, forward prices are
martingales, as also remarked and studied by Geman (62).
Cash ows can occur over a wide range of investment horizons. The dynamics of
risk factors and the properties of risk-return tradeos may dier across alternative time
scales. For asset pricing in the long horizon, it seems to be appropriate and convenient
to introduce an alternative SDF decomposition by using the long bond (i.e., zero-coupon
bond with extremely long maturity) as the numeraire. Alvarez and Jermann (5) explore
this topic in discrete time and nd that the pricing kernel has a very volatile permanent
martingale component. Hansen and Scheinkman (70) establish a systematic development
for the long-run SDF factorization in a general continuous-time Markovian economy. Using
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the approach of semigroup pricing operator1, Hansen and Scheinkman (70) show a multi-
plicative decomposition of SDF into three components: an exponential term determined by
the principal eigenvalue, a transient eigenfunction term, and a permanent martingale term.
The principal eigenvalue encodes the risk adjustment, the martingale component alters the
probability measure to capture long-run approximations, and the principal eigenfunction
gives the long-run state dependence. Further theoretical developments in Ref. (68, 71, 17,
18, 113, and 114). Among those, Qin and Linetsky (114) take the martingale approach and
make an excellent extension of the long-term SDF factorization to general semi-martingale
environments. Related empirical studies can be found in Ref. (69, 9, 8, 115, 11, 10, and
30). Among those, Bakshi and Chabi-Yo (9) derive and test new variance bounds closely
related to the results of Alvarez and Jermann (5). More recently, Christensen (30) provides
a nonparametric approach to reconstruct the time series of the estimated permanent and
transitory components.
A further strand of literature closely related to the one outlined above is on the recovery
theory proposed by Ross (119). It is a theoretical procedure based on the Perron-Frobenius
theorem that permits the recovery of physical probabilities from prices of contingent claims
in a nite-state discrete-time Markov environment. Martin and Ross (110) also discuss
identication of recovered probability measure with the long forward measure. Carr and
Yu (24) extend Ross' arguments to one-dimensional diusion processes that are constrained
on nite intervals with regular boundary conditions. This setup allows the use of Sturm-
Liouville theory to single out a unique positive eigenfunction and achieve the recovery result
1When the economy is driven by time-homogeneous Markovian state variables, the pricing operators
indexed by time form an semigroup operator. This semigroup approach was introduced by Garman (60).
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similar to Ross (119). Further extensions are made by Dubynskiy and Goldstein (44) and
Walden (130) in more general diusion models. Borovicka et al. (18) remark that in Ross'
recovery the key assumption of transition-independent pricing kernel2 restricts the permanent
martingale component (in the Hansen-Scheinkman decomposition) to be degenerate. This
limitation has quite dierent economic implications that are not fully clear in the literature.
The work in this chapter complements the existing literature following Alvarez and
Jermann (5) and Hansen and Scheinkman (70). Here, the no-arbitrage martingale approach
is taken in a general Markovian diusion setup under the key condition that the long forward
rate is constant. A constant long forward rate is plausible in a normal economy according to
Dybvig, Ingersoll, and Ross (48). If so, the price behavior of long-maturity bonds is found
to exhibit separable dependence on time and state (Proposition 7). This property can be
utilized to give a simpler proof (Proposition 8) of the Hansen-Scheinkman decomposition, i.e.,
the pricing kernel can be expressed as a product of the transient and permanent components,
where the transient one encodes the same information of long bonds and the permanent one
is a martingale dening the transition to the long forward measure. In fact, the long forward
rate corresponds to the principal eigenvalue of the pricing operator, whereas the associated
eigenfunction is determined by the state-dependence of long bonds (Corollary 11). When
the Markovian economy is recurrent, the long forward rate must be constant because it can
never fall by the arguments of Dybvig et al. (48) and it cannot rise either by the recurrent
property. In this case, one can nd a pair of principal eigenvalue and eigenfunction of the
pricing operator (Corollary 12) as in Hansen and Scheinkman (70).
2Pricing kernels are generally transition-dependent, for example, in models with recursive preferences as
analyzed by Hansen and Scheinkman (71).
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Next, analyzing the forward measure and its Radon-Nikodym derivative yields an ana-
lytical expression for the permanent martingale term whose Girsanov kernel is the sum of the
market prices of risk and the long bond return volatility (Proposition 9). This result implies
the covariance between permanent and transitory components (Corollary 13). In general,
the permanent martingale is not degenerate nor orthogonal to the transitory component,
consistent with the empirical results reported by Bakshi et al. (10) and Christensen (30).
An important observation in this chapter is that the long-run SDF decomposition can
be feasible but may not be unique when the economy does not have an equivalent martingale
measure. Heston, Loewenstein, and Willard (77) point out that there may exist multiple
solutions to the asset pricing partial dierential equations when certain theoretical conditions
fail to hold. For example, an interest rate model developed by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (34)
may exclude the equivalent martingale measure under certain parameters. This indicates
bubbles in bond prices and potential arbitrage opportunities. In this stationary economy, a
unique long-forward rate can be found, but the long-run SDF decomposition is not unique
as it depends on how bonds are valued.
The Girsanov kernel for the long forward measure uncovers a strong restriction in a
family of interest rate models which implicitly assume a degenerate permanent martingale.
This restriction means that the market prices of risk have to cancel with the long bond
return volatility in those models (Proposition 10). Examples include the quadratic term
structure model proposed by Constantinides (33) and models generated by the probabilistic
potential approach of Rogers (117). A remedy is suggested to avoid this restriction issue.
It is recognized that pricing kernels in models such as Ross' Recovery and Lucas' Tree are
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transition-independent. Nonetheless, the general equilibrium production economy devel-
oped by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (35) naturally produces a transition-dependent SDF. This
SDF has a non-degenerate permanent martingale term and encodes exible risk premiums
(Proposition 11), showing the advantage of this framework for interest rate modeling.
3.2 Long-Run Pricing Kernel Factorization
This section gives the general setup and key results. If the long forward rate is at, then
long-maturity bonds could exhibit almost separable dependence on time and state. This fea-
ture inspires a simple proof for the Hansen-Scheinkman decomposition which was originally
developed using the semigroup approach. Several examples in this section will show how to
nd the long forward measure without solving the eigenfunction problem.
3.2.1 General Setup and Assumptions
I focus on bond pricing in this chapter. The state variables considered here are any of
those that aect the bond market. The following standard assumptions are made about the
economy:
(A1) The economy is stationary and Markovian.
(A2) The market is frictionless.
(A3) The market admits no arbitrage.
(A4) The pricing rule is time consistent.
As for (A1), the state of economy is characterized by a k × 1 vector of state variables, Xt,
92
which are dened on the probability space (Ω,Ft,P) and take values on a state space Rk.
The sample paths of X are continuous from the right with left limits. They are assumed to
be stationary and ergodic, satisfying the general time-homogeneous Itô diusion process:
dXt = µX(Xt)dt+ ΣX(Xt)dWt, (3.1)
where Wt represents a d-dimensional Ft-measurable Brownian motion. The drift term µX(·)
and the diusion term ΣX(·) satisfy the usual Lipschitz continuity condition that ensures the
existence of a unique strong solution X to Eq. (3.1). It is further assumed that Σ>X(x)ΣX(x)
is nonsingular and invertible so that the Brownian increment can be inferred from the sample
path of X. As a direct implication of (A2) and (A3), arbitrage opportunities are ruled out
in a frictionless economy if and only if there exists a strictly positive stochastic discount
factor (SDF) process; see Harrison and Kreps (73), denoted by {Mt}t≥0 with M0 = 1.
These conditions also imply the existence of a risk-neutral measure Q equivalent to the
physical measure P so that assets in this economy can be priced in the risk-neutral world
by discounting their future cash ows using the (locally) risk-free interest rate, r(Xt). The
time consistency of the pricing rule (A4) means that asset pricing is independent of the
calendar time at which the asset is valued. Mathematically, this property can be expressed
as Mt+s(ω) = Mt(ω)Ms(Θt(ω)), where Θs : Ω → Ω denes the time-shift operator so that






∣∣∣∣Ft] = EP [MTMt ψ(XT )
∣∣∣∣Ft] , (3.2)
where the last step follows from the Markovian assumption (A1). Expression (3.2) allows
us to dene a pricing operator Pt by the pricing rule below:
Ptψ(x) = EP[Mtψ(Xt)|X0 = x], (3.3)
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which sets the time-zero price of a payo ψ(Xt) realized at time t as a function of X0 = x.
As remarked by Garman (60), the temporal consistency of pricing rule (A4) implies that the
family of linear pricing operators {Pt : t ≥ 0} forms a semigroup: P0 = I and Pt+sψ(x) =
PtPsψ(x). This forms the basis of semigroup arguments of Hansen and Scheinkman (70).
3.2.2 Long-run SDF Factorization
The long-maturity discount bond price is key to the long-run SDF decomposition. Clearly,
the time-t price of a default-free zero-coupon bond that pays one dollar at time T is
PT−t1 = EQ[e−
∫ T
t r(Xs)ds|Ft] = EP[MT−t|Xt] = P (T − t,Xt), (3.4)
which only depends on its remaining maturity (T − t) and the state variables at time t. If
Assumption (A4) is relaxed (e.g., if investors have time-varying preference), the bond price
may depend on the calendar time of valuation. We write P (t, T,Xt) in general.
Denition 1. It is standard to dene the forward rate as
f(t, T,Xt) = −
∂ logP (t, T,Xt)
∂T
, (3.5)
and the zero coupon rate (or yield) as




Let's further dene the long forward rate and the long zero coupon rate, respectively, by
fl(t,Xt) = lim
T→∞




Lemma 1. If the (nonzero) long forward rate exists, then the long zero coupon rate also exists
and equals the long forward rate state by state at any point of time: fl(t,Xt) = zl(t,Xt).
Proof. Dybvig et al. (48) proved the above statement in discrete time. For the continuous-







For an arbitrary state vector Xt = x ∈ Rk, one can take limits on both sides and derive that
zl(t, x) = lim
T→∞








f(t, T, x)ds = fl(t, x). (3.9)
The L'Hôpital's rule is used since both
∫ T
t
f(t, s, x)ds and (T − t) explode as T →∞.
In a normal economy, the discount bond price approaches zero when its maturity goes to
innity, i.e., P (t, T,Xt)→ 0 as T →∞. The long forward rate actually sets the pace of this
asymptotic behavior. In fact, Lemma 1 imposes simple constraints on the price behavior of
long-maturity discount bonds.
Proposition 7. If the long forward rate is constant (denoted by ρ), then the logarithm of
discount bond price can be decomposed into three terms
logP (T − t,Xt) = −ρ · (T − t)− g(Xt) + ε(T − t,Xt), (3.10)
where g(x) ≡ limT→∞(z(T − t, x) − ρ) · (T − t) is a limiting function of Xt = x and the
residual term ε(T − t,Xt) is vanishing at innitely long maturity: limT→∞ ε(T − t,Xt) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.1
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Proposition 7 suggests that the discount bond price exhibits separable dependence on time
and state variables when its maturity is innitely long. This property enables us to introduce
the concept of long bond by eliminating the transient dependencies of discount bonds.
Denition 2. The price function below will be referred to as the long bond :
P∞(T − t,Xt) ≡ e−ρ(T−t)−g(Xt). (3.11)
Condition 1. The residual term ε(T − t, x) is non-decreasing with T given any x.
Condition 2. The residual term ε(T − t, x) ≤ K(x) for any x where EQ[eK(Xt)−g(Xt)] <∞.
Proposition 8. If the long forward rate is constant (denoted ρ), then the stochastic discount





where φ(Xt) = e
−g(Xt) > 0 and ξPt is a local martingale with respect to P satisfying ξP0 = 1.
When ξPt is a strictly positive martingale, it denes a change of measure from the physical
probability P to the long forward measure QL where the long bond serves as the numeraire.
Proof. Since the zero-coupon bond price is a Q-martingale, we have for any t ∈ [0, T ],
P (T,X0) = E
Q[P (T − t,Xt)|X0] = EP[MtP (T − t,Xt)|X0]. (3.13)
If the long forward rate has a constant limit ρ, then the discount bond prices can be de-




= eε(T,X0) = EP
[
Mt
P (T − t,Xt)
P∞(T,X0)
∣∣∣∣X0] = EP [eρtMt φ(Xt)φ(X0)eε(T−t,Xt)
∣∣∣∣X0] . (3.14)
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As T → ∞, both ε(T − t,Xt) and ε(T,X0) shrink to zero. Under Condition 1, the term
eε(T−t,Xt) is non-decreasing with its maturity so that one can use the Monotone Convergence
Theorem to exchange limit and expectation. Under Condition 2, the term φ(Xt)e
ε(T−t,Xt)
in Eq. (3.14) is bounded by an integrable function so that one can apply the Dominated
Convergence Theorem to exchange limit and expectation. Thus, under Condition 1 or 2, the
following result holds after taking the limit T →∞ on both sides of Eq. (3.14):
lim
T→∞








∣∣∣∣X0] = EP [eρtMt φ(Xt)φ(X0)
∣∣∣∣X0] . (3.15)
Dene ξPt ≡ eρtMt
φ(Xt)
φ(X0)
which starts from the unity (ξPt=0 = 1). By Eq. (3.15), ξ
P is a
diusion process with zero drift and hence it is a local martingale. When ξPt is a strictly
positive martingale, it will dene a new measure QL equivalent to P on each Ft. Under this









∣∣∣∣Xt = x] = EQL [e−ρ(T−t) φ(Xt)φ(XT )ψ(XT )
∣∣∣∣Xt = x] . (3.16)
Hence, the new measure QL will be referred to as the long forward measure henceforth.
The above SDF factorization is derived by the arbitrage-free martingale approach. This
contrasts with the semigroup operator approach by Hansen and Scheinkman (70) who show
that the factorization result could be achieved by solving the eigenfunction problem of pricing
operator. We demonstrate the equivalence of these two approaches:
Corollary 11. If the long forward rate is constant, then ρ and φ(x) = e−g(x) > 0 denes a
pair of eigenvalue and eigenfunction for the pricing operator under any initial state X0 = x:
Ptφ(x) = e−ρtφ(x). (3.17)
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∣∣∣∣X0 = x] . (3.18)







∣∣∣∣X0 = x] = e−ρtφ(x), (3.19)
which holds for any X0 = x. The innitesimal generator A of the operator Pt = etA satises
Aφ = −ρφ. (3.20)
Thus, φ(x) = e−g(x) is a positive eigenfunction of A and the associated eigenvalue is −ρ.
3.2.3 When will the Long Forward Rate be Flat?
The development so far hinges on the economic condition that the long forward rate has a
constant limit. An interesting nding by Dybvig et al. (48) in discrete time is that the long
forward rates never fall. This result also holds in general continuous-time setup, as proved
by Hubalek, Klein, and Teichmayn (83).
Lemma 2. (The long forward rates can never fall.) Suppose that the long forward rate exists
at time s and t with s < t, then fl(s,Xs) ≤ fl(t,Xt) almost surely.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.2. The proof is adapted from Ref. (83).
A sucient condition to make the long forward rate constant is that the state of economy is
recurrent: given that the long forward rates cannot fall, if they must return again and again
to the current level, these rates cannot rise either. A constant long forward rate is unique.
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Corollary 12. If the economy is driven by recurrent Markov processes, the long forward rate
cannot rise and has to be constant over time. In this case, both Propositions 7 and 8 hold.
At rst glance, it seems to be a strong assumption that the entire state of the economy
will return again and again to any realized state. There may be some weaker condition
than this assumption. Dybvig et al. (48) wrote that: On economic grounds, it is hard to
imagine that we will ever learn enough about how the economy works to ensure that the long
discount rate can never subsequently return to today's value. Given that the long discount
rate cannot fall, this is enough to prove it is constant. Therefore, we should think of the
ordinary situation as one in which the long discount rate is constant."
The arguments can be strengthened: First, the forward rate derived from the discount
bonds should not depend on every state variable of the entire economy. Empirical studies
suggest that the bond market is priced by only a few risk factors that are largely uncorrelated
with the equity risk factors; see Fama and French (50). Second, the state variables (e.g., term
premia) that inuence the forward rates are usually stationary or mean-reverting, making
the interest rate process stationary or mean-reverting as well. If those bond-market state
variables repeatedly revisit their current levels, the forward rate cannot rise and has to be
constant according to Corollary 12. The assumption of stationarity, recurrency, or ergodicity
have usually been made in the literature following Hansen and Scheinkman (70) to prove the
existence of the principal eigenvalue and eigenfunction for the SDF factorization. Why are
those assumptions crucial for the SDF decomposition? The answer is clear from Corollary
12, because all those assumptions imply that the long forward rate is at which is the central
condition for Proposition 8.
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3.2.4 How to Find the Long Forward Rate?
To factorize the pricing kernel as in Eq. (3.12), one just needs to know the long forward rate
ρ and the function g(Xt) which governs the price volatility of long bond. The decomposition
in Eq. (3.10) is quite useful if one can guess the functional form of g(x). The long bond
price P∞(T − t,Xt) = e−ρ(T−t)−g(Xt) should be an asymptotic solution to the general bond
pricing equation. This point is illustrated through a few examples below.
Example 2.1. Consider the single-factor model in Cox et al. (34) where the risk-free interest
rate rt = Xt follows a square-root diusion process under risk-neutral measure Q:





with κ > 0, θ > 0, and σ > 0. The Feller condition 2κθ > σ2 ensures the strict positivity
of interest rate. The above Itô process is stationary, recurrent and mean-reverting. So the
long forward rate in this economy is constant by Corollary 12. Applying the Feynman-Kac












The CIR model has an ane term structure so that one can guess g(Xt) is a linear function
of Xt. Plugging the long bond P∞(T − t, x) = e−ρ(T−t)−γx into Eq. (3.22) yields
1
2
γ2σ2x− γκ(θ − x) + ρ = x, (3.23)
which holds if and only if ρ and γ solve
ρ = γκθ (3.24)
1
2
γ2σ2 + γκ = 1. (3.25)
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The admissible (positive) solution is
γ =
√




κ2 + 2σ2 + κ
(3.26)





κ2 + 2σ2 − κ). (3.27)
It is not necessary to solve the entire partial dierential equation to obtain ρ and γ, although
it can a good exercise to verify the solution when a closed-form bond price formula is avail-
able. The semigroup approach of Hansen and Scheinkman (70) requires nding the principal
eigenvalue and eigenfunction of the semigroup pricing operator. In this example, it amounts






+ κ(θ − x)∂φ
∂x
− xφ = −ρφ. (3.28)
This is the conuent hypergeometric equation whose solutions can be expressed in terms
of Kummer and Tricomi functions; see Qin and Linetsky (113). It takes some more eorts
to identify that the principal eigenvalue of the CIR pricing operator is indeed given by Eq.
(3.27) and the principal (strictly positive) eigenfunction is indeed φ(x) = e−γXt where γ is
given by Eq. (3.26). This example shows the technical convenience brought by the long
bond formula.
The same approach can be applied to the more general multi-factor ane term struc-
ture model3 where the functional form of g(Xt) is known to be an ane function of the
factors Xt. Similarly, it can be applied to quadratic-Gaussian term structure models
4 where
the discount bond prices are exponential-quadratic and bond yields are quadratic functions
of Gaussian factors. In all such models, if the long forward rate is a positive constant, then
3See Ref. 109, 47, and 37.
4See Ref. 33 and 3.
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all one needs to solve is a system of algebraic equations, instead of a system of Riccati ODEs
or Sturm-Liouville equations. It is worth noting that the proof of Proposition 7 does not
require that the underlying state variables evolve as the Itô diusion process. 7 can also be
applicable for jump-diusion processes. This is illustrated by the next example.
Example 2.2. The interest rate rt = Xt is assumed to follow a square-root diusion process
augmented with a Poisson jump process5 under the risk-neutral measure Q:




t + dJt. (3.29)
Here, Jt denotes the compound Poisson process with a jump arrival rate λ > 0 and expo-
nentially distributed jump sizes with mean size µ > 0. This model is still stationary and
recurrent, implying that the long forward rate is at. Again, substituting the long bond














[P (·, x+ y)− P (·, x)]λ
µ
e−y/µdy = xP, (3.30)
one can derive a simple algebraic equation
1
2
γ2σ2x− γκ(θ − x) + ρ− λµγ
1 + µγ
= x. (3.31)
The admissible (positive) solution turns out to be
γ =
√
κ2 + 2σ2 − κ
σ2
(3.32)








κ2 + 2σ2 − κ) + λµγ
1 + µγ
. (3.33)
The parameter γ is the same as Eq. (3.26) in the CIR model, whereas the long forward rate
ρ now is equal to the CIR long rate in Eq. (3.27) plus an additional term, λµγ
1+µγ
, due to the
5See Ref. 46 and 51 for this example.
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jump component. The principal eigenvalue in this example is larger than that of the original
CIR model. The extra premium λµγ
1+µγ
compensates investors for their exposure to the jump
risk which increases with the jump arrival rate λ as well as the mean jump size µ.
The eigenfunction problem for a jump-diusion pricing operator is usually intractable.
The asymptotic analysis based on the long bond formula somehow circumvents the diculty.
This approach can be extended to general multi-factor ane jump-diusion models. It is,
however, not restricted to ane term structure models, as shown by the next example.
Example 2.3. Merton (111) derived the following quadratic drift model for the interest rate:
dXt = κ(θ −Xt)Xtdt+ σXtdWQt . (3.34)
When the Feller's condition holds (2κθ/σ2 > 1), both the origin and innity are inaccessible,












Substituting the long bond price, P∞(T − t, x) = e−ρ(T−t)x−γ, into the above equation yields
1
2
σ2γ(γ + 1)x−γ − γκ(θ − x)x−γ + ρx−γ = x−γ+1. (3.36)
The solution is found to be γ = 1/κ and
ρ = γκθ − 1
2




It can take a lot of algebra to verify that φ(x) = x1/κ is indeed the principal eigenfunction.
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3.3 Long Forward Measure and SDF Decomposition
This section discusses the long forward measure and the associated SDF decomposition. An
explicit expression for the permanent martingale component is provided. This result reveals
an implicit restriction on the market prices of risk in a popular approach for interest rate
modeling. This restriction is due to the degeneracy of permanent martingale component.
3.3.1 The T -Forward Measure
The T -forward measure, denoted by QT , refers to a change of numeraire where the new unit
of account is the T -maturity discount bond. The change from the risk-neutral measure Q to













where P (t, T,Xt) = E
P
t [MT/Mt] is the pure discount bond price. Under Q, this solves
dP (t, T,Xt)
P (t, T,Xt)
= rt(Xt)dt− σP (t, T,Xt)>dWQt , (3.39)
where the d × 1 vector σP (t, T,Xt) represents the instantaneous volatility at time t of the
discount bond return. By Itô's lemma, it is easy to deduce that
dηTt
ηTt
= −σP (t, T,Xt)>dWQt . So
the Girsanov kernel for the measure change from Q to QT is set by the volatility σP (t, T,Xt).





















t ] = 1. Under the T -forward measure, the time-t price of a






∣∣∣∣Ft] = P (t, T,Xt)EP [ξTt ψ(XT )|Ft] = P (t, T,Xt)EQT [ψ(XT )],
(3.41)
from which one can see the T -bond P (t, T,Xt) serves as the new numeraire. Let ϑt(Xt) be
the d×1 vector of market prices of risk associated with the d×1 vector of Brownian motions
Wt. Then, −ϑt is the Girsanov kernel for transition from P to Q, i.e.,
dMt
Mt
= −rtdt− ϑ>t dW Pt . (3.42)
Applying Itô's lemma to Eq. (3.40) yields
dξTt
ξTt
= [ϑt(Xt) + σP (t, T,Xt)]
>dW Pt = ϑ̃(t, T,Xt)
>dW Pt , (3.43)
where the d× 1 kernel vector, ϑ̃(t, T,Xt) ≡ ϑt(Xt) + σP (t, T,Xt), can be interpreted as the














which can be a strictly positive martingale under regularity conditions. For more discussions
about the forward measure, see Musiela and Rutkowski (112).
3.3.2 The Long Forward Measure
The measure QL in Proposition 8 is referred to as the long forward measure since the long
bond price P∞ serves as the numeraire under QL. In fact, the long-forward measure is the
limit of T -forward measure with T →∞. The results in the previous subsection can be used
to prove the result below:
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Proposition 9. If the long forward rate is constant and the market prices of Brownian mo-




where φ(x) = e−g(x) and the permanent (local) martingale ξPt solves the Itô process
dξPt
ξPt
= −[ϑt + σ∞(Xt)]>dWt. (3.45)
Here, σ∞ = ΣX
∂g
∂X
represents the long bond return volatility.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.3.
Now let's dene πt ≡ e−ρt φ(X0)φ(Xt) as the transient component of the pricing kernel. Both the
permanent and transient components, πt and ξ
P
t , are correlated with each other in general.
Corollary 13. By Itô's lemma, the covariance between the permanent and transient com-









= −σ∞(Xt)>[ϑt(Xt) + σ∞(Xt)]dt. (3.46)
Intuitively, the long bond yields uctuate with business conditions. This aects the
discounting rate for valuing other risky assets. Eq. (3.46) suggests that the covariance can
vanish for either σ∞(Xt) = 0 or ϑt+σ∞(Xt) = 0. For illustration, the CIR model is revisited:
Example 2.1 (continued). For the one-factor CIR model (rt = Xt), the long bond price is
P∞(T − t,Xt) = exp[−ρ(T − t) − γXt], whose return volatility is σ∞(Xt) = γσ
√
Xt. With
the linear risk premium as in Cox et al. (34), the market price of risk is ϑt = λ
√
Xt, where
λ is constant. Since parameters such as κ and θ are dened under the risk neutral measure
Q, the drift of long bond return process under P is
µ∞(Xt) = rt − σ∞(Xt)ϑt = (1− λγσ)Xt. (3.47)
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The pricing kernel in the CIR model thus takes the following factorization:
MCIRt = πt · ξPt = e−ρteγ(Xt−X0)ξPt , (3.48)
where the Girsanov kernel of permanent martingale ξPt is −[ϑt + σ∞(Xt)] = −(λ+ γσ)
√
Xt.









= −γσ(λ+ γσ)Xtdt, (3.49)
the sign of which is the opposite sign of (λ+γσ) if the Feller condition holds (P (Xt > 0) = 1).







= 0 should rarely hold. Of course, it holds in the trivial case of a constant interest
rate (i.e., σ = 0), and the corresponding market price of risk vanishes (ϑt = 0) in the ab-
sence of any interest rate risk. Constant interest rates imply that the permanent martingale
is degenerate (ξTt = 1) and the pricing kernel is simply an exponential function of time.





are perfectly correlated (if λ < −γσ) or perfectly anti-correlated
(λ > −γσ). Thus, the instantaneous correlation coecient between the increments of per-
manent and transient components is either 1, 0, or −1. These extreme correlation values are
resulted from the single-factor assumption. As shown in the next example, a multi-factor
CIR model can generate a wide range of values for this correlation coecient.
Example 3.1. A two-factor CIR model was studied by Longsta and Schwartz (109). Let's
consider a multi-factor CIR model for the interest rate given by rt =
∑k
i=1Xi(t), where





for positive constants κi, θi, and σi, with theW
Q
i being independent Brownian motions under
107
the risk neutral measure Q. Assume that the market price of risk ϑt associated with the i-th
Brownian motion WQi is equal to λi
√
Xi(t) with constant λi for i = 1, ..., k. The long bond
price now takes the form P∞(t, T ) = exp[−ρ(T − t) − γ>Xt], where it is easy to solve that
ρ =
∑k
i=1 γiκiθi and γ = (γ1, ..., γk)




i − κi)/σ2i for i = 1, ..., k. The



























which can take any value in [−1, 1], depending on the values ofX1(t), ..., Xk(t) and (λ1, ..., λk).
In general, the permanent martingale component in the bond market is not orthogonal








6= 0. This can be easily observed from
Eq. (3.46). Of course, there is also a large volatile permanent martingale that links to the
state variables (risk factors) for the equity market. Since the correlation between bond and
equity is weak, the correlation between the entire permanent martingale component and
the transitory component is mostly attributable to their common risk factors in the bond
market. As we stressed before, the permanent martingale attributable to the bond market is
non-degenerate unless the condition ϑt+σ∞(Xt) = 0 holds. But there is no economic reason
to believe that investors would restrict their preferences to meet ϑt = −σ∞(Xt). Therefore,
the long-run SDF factorization is unlikely to be an orthogonal decomposition if it contains
a nontrivial martingale component. This is consistent with empirical results in Ref. (5, 9,
10, and 30).
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3.3.3 Long-Forward Rate under Bond Price Bubbles
In an arbitrage-free market with a strictly positive SDF, the principal eigenvalue (i.e., the
long-forward rate) in the Hansen-Scheinkman decomposition is usually associated with a
unique eigenfunction (related to the state-dependence of long bonds). We will explore a sta-
tionary economy that does not have the equivalent martingale measure (EMM) and thus per-
mits multiple solutions to discount bond pricing. In this economy, the constant long-forward
rate is associated with multiple eigenfunctions. This result sheds light on the applicability
of Hansen-Scheinkman factorization in the presence of asset price bubbles.
Let's review the arbitrage example that was rst conjectured in Section 5 of Cox et al.
(34) and later claried by Heston et al. (77). Consider a single-factor CIR economy where
the interest rate process under the physical measure P is





with κ > 0 and θ > 0. When the Feller condition holds (i.e., 2κθ > σ2), the upward drift is
large enough to ensure that r cannot hit the origin in nite time under P. This inequality
also prevents the (local) market price of risk from becoming innite and thus rules out
instantaneously protable arbitrage opportunities. With a linear risk premium ψ0 +ψ1r, the











− rP = (ψ0 + ψ1r)Pr, (3.52)




6See Theorem 2 of Cox et al. (35) and Section 5 of Cox et al. (34). Another popular approach for bond















− rP = 0. (3.53)
By Feynman-Kac formula, a solution to Eq. (3.53) can be written as a conditional expecta-




t rsds | rt = r
]
, under the new probability measure Q such that r is
an Itô process driven by the equation
drt = κ





The key point is that Q is not necessarily equivalent with the physical probability P, as they
may not agree on zero probability events. The standard CIR solution to the discount bond
price is given by P1(t, T, r) = A(t, T ) exp[−rB(t, T )], where








B(t, T ) =
2(eη(T−t) − 1)
2η + (κ′ + η)(eη(T−t) − 1)
. (3.56)
Heston et al. (77) noticed that some parameter values may give rise to arbitrage opportunities
as there may exist multiple PDE solutions that permit money market bubbles. The following
lemma is taken from Example 1.1 from their paper:
Lemma 3. For ψ0 >
2κθ−σ2
2
such that 2κ′θ′ < σ2, the original CIR solution is not the
cheapest nonnegative solution. The cheaper solution is
P2(t, T, r) = A(t, T )e
−rB(t,T )
[








incomplete gamma function, and













This cheaper solution P2(t, T, r) is strictly less than the standard CIR solution P1(t, T, r)
prior to maturity, but it agrees with P1(t, T, r) at maturity for r > 0.
Several important implications can be drawn from this example:
• There is no equivalent (local) martingale measure in this economy when 2κ′θ′ < σ2,
because if there were an EMM (say Q), the locally risk-free rate would have a weak drift
κ′(θ′ − r) and hit zero with positive probability under Q which disagrees with P regarding
zero probability events. As Heston et al. (77) explained, the bond price dierence P1 − P2
is the price of a claim that pays 1 dollar if the interest rate hits zero prior to maturity7.
• If the bond price is given by the standard CIR solution P1(t, T, r), there will be an
arbitrage opportunity which is exploitable by short selling P1 and going long the replicating
strategy for P2
8. This strategy essentially sells the claim that pays in the event the interest
rate hits zero under Q. When r is very close to zero, the strategy may suer temporary
losses as P2 − P1 < 0. However, these losses are lower bounded because P2 − P1 ≥ −1. This
arbitrage strategy can be feasible at a large scale if investors adjust the wealth constraints
for this strategy; see Heston et al. (77) as well as Delbaen and Schachermayer (39).
• The pricing equation permits a class of solutions, indexed by w ∈ [0, 1] and given by
P1+w(t, T, r) = A(t, T )e
−rB(t,T )
[




For any w < 1, the replicating cost of P1+w exceeds the replicating cost of P2. This violates
7Although the origin is inaccessible under P, the measure Q would assign this a positive probability and
price this event. P2(t, T, r) becomes zero if the interest rate hits the origin prior to maturity.
8There exist replicating portfolios for the discount bond price given by either solution when 2κθ > σ2. It
indicates an arbitrage opportunity as two replicating portfolios with the same payo have dierent costs.
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the law of one price as their payouts are the same at maturity. It leads to the bond price
bubble P1+w − P2 = wA(T − t)e−B(T−t)r Γ(ν,rζ(t,T ))Γ(ν,0) , which is nonnegative and bounded above
by w. Moreover, the long forward rate is the same for this class of bond price solutions:
ρ = lim
T→∞













Thus, a unique long forward rate exists in this economy where there is no EMM however.
It seems sensible to price discount bonds by the lowest cost of their replicating portfo-
lios, i.e., P2(t, T, r) given by Eq. (3.57). With the linear risk premium ψ0 + ψ1r, the instan-




. When 2κθ ≥ σ2, it is
nite almost surely and rules out any instantaneously protable arbitrages. The market price
















is not an equivalent martingale measure in this economy if 2κ′θ′ < σ2. Can we still factorize
Mt in the multiplicative form? It is easy to verify the following limit result
lim
T→∞






































(κ+ ψ1)2 + 2σ2 − κ− ψ1
σ2
. (3.62)











Γ(ν, 0)− Γ(ν, 2η
σ2
rt)
] ξPt . (3.63)
112
By Proposition 9, we have dξPt = −[ϑt + σ∞(rt)]ξPt dW Pt , where


















rt [Γ(ν, 0)− Γ(ν, 2ηrt/σ2)]
. (3.64)
This example of CIR model shows that the long-run SDF decomposition can be feasible
even when the economy does not have an equivalent martingale measure. In this case, the
long forward rate is unique, but the SDF decomposition is not necessarily unique.
3.3.4 The Markov Potential Approach for Term Structure Models
There has been an alternative approach preceded by Constantinides (33) and formalized
by Rogers (117) to model interest rates. This approach directly species the pricing kernel
by modeling it as the probabilistic potential. It has become popular partially because it
can generate a variety of models with positive interest rates. Nonetheless, there is a strong
restriction in this approach, which can limit its use in model calibration with market data.
Denition 3. A random process Zt is called a probabilistic potential if Zt is a non-negative
supermartingale for any t and E[Zt]→ 0 as t→∞.
If interest rates are strictly positive and the economic condition limT→∞ P (t, T,Xt) = 0
holds, then the pricing kernel Mt is a probabilistic potential. In other words, any pricing
kernel generating a positive term structure is a potential; see Chapter 28 in Bjork (15). How
to construct a potential that qualies as a pricing kernel for arbitrage-free bond pricing?
Rogers (117) proposed a systematic procedure of constructing such potentials in terms of
the resolvent of time-homogeneous Markov process.
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Without loss of generality, consider an economy where the state variables Xt follow the
multi-dimensional Itô diusion process under the physical measure P:
dXt = µX(Xt)dt+ ΣX(Xt)dWt, (3.65)












We shall focus on the intuition and skip technical discussions on regularity conditions which
can be found in Rogers (117). For any nonnegative α, the resolvent Rα is an operator that
maps a bounded measurable real valued function q into the real valued function Rαq. It is






∣∣∣∣X0 = x] . (3.67)
It can be proved that for any bounded nonnegative function q(x), the process Zt = e
−αtRαq(Xt)
is a potential (15). If Zt is chosen as the pricing kernel, the discount bond price is







and the risk-free interest rate is given by rt =
q(Xt)
Rαq(Xt)
. There is a useful relationship, Rα =










This is easy to handle when the innitesimal generator G is given.
Rogers (117) proposed to construct the pricing kernel for positive interest rates in the
following procedure. The rst step is to specify a Markov process X, a real positive constant
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α, and a nonnegative function f . Dene q(x) = (α−G)f(x) and choose parameters to ensure
that q(x) is a nonnegative function. Since f(x) = Rαq(x), the interest rate is determined by
Eq. (3.69). Below is a simple example as discussed in both Rogers (117) and Bjork (15):
Example 3.2. Consider an economy driven by a single-factor OrnsteinUhlenbeck process:








γ2σ2 + βγXt, (3.71)
which is a one-factor ane Gaussian model, similar to Vasicek (127). In this economy, the
discount bond price is given by














dWs so that Eq. (3.72) becomes



















The exponential martingale in the expectation of Eq. (3.73) denes a change of measure

















By Eq. (3.71), the bond price Eq. (3.73) can be rewritten as
















Alternatively, the discount bond price under the risk-neutral measure Q should be






Comparing Eq. (3.75) and Eq. (3.76), one can see that Q and Q̃ coincide. Thus the market
price of risk should be ϑ = −γσ. Moreover, the long-term bond price can be easily found,
P∞(t, T ) = exp[−α(T − t) − γXt]. The long forward rate is set by the constant parameter
α > 0 and the long bond return volatility is σ∞ = γσ. In this example, one can easily see
that the market price of risk exactly cancels out with the long bond volatility, i.e., ϑ+σ∞ = 0.
In fact, ϑt + σ∞ = 0 is the general restriction on any interest rate models constructed
by Rogers' approach. It is dicult to justify that the market prices of risk have to equal
the long bond return volatility. Practitioners may it dicult to calibrate this type of model
since its risk premium is overly restricted. Traders may incur utility loss if they are unaware
of the restriction in this modeling approach.
Proposition 10. Interest rate models constructed by the probabilistic potential approach are
subject to an implicit restriction on the market prices of risk. Specically, if one assumes
the pricing kernel is of the form Mt = e
−αt+g(Xt) where Xt is a Markov homogeneous process
with stationary limiting distribution, then the long bond price takes the form P∞(t, T,Xt) =
e−α(T−t)−g(Xt). The market prices of risk are restricted to be
ϑt(Xt) = −σ∞(Xt) = −g′(Xt)>ΣX(Xt). (3.77)
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.4.
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Example 3.3. Squared-autoregressive-independent-variable nominal term structure (SAINTS)
model by Constantinides (33) is probably the earliest model that directly constructs Mt as















where xi(t) for i = 0, ..., N are Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes dened by
dxi(t) = −λixi(t)dt+ σidWi(t). (3.79)
Here, W0(t), W1(t), ...,WN(t) are independent Brownian motions, and ρ > 0, σ0 ≥ 0, σi > 0,
αi, λ0 = 0, λi > 0 (for i = 1, ..., N) are all constants. Note that only x0(t) is not stationary




t + x0(t) to dene an exponential
martingale ex̃0(t) orthogonal to any other state variables. The mere presence of x̃0(t) in Mt
will not aect interest rate dynamics nor bond prices. Direct application of Proposition 10
to the Constantinides model leads to the nding that the long forward rate is given by ρ.
Moreover, the market prices of risk associated with the 0-th Brownian motion and the i-th
Brownian motion are −σ0 and −2σi[xi(t)− αi], respectively. These exactly cancel out with
the long bond return volatility. The long bond price takes the form:








This expression can also be obtained by examining the closed-form solution to P (t, T,Xt)
in Constantinides (33) and taking the limit T → ∞. Applying the general result of Eq.
(3.123), one can also obtain the interest rate process derived in Ref. (33).
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As stated in Proposition 10, all interest rate models constructed from the potential
approach is subject to the strong restriction that the market prices of risk exactly cancel
with the long bond return volatility. Investors may incur utility losses by using a restricted
model.
Proposition 9 provides a remedy to this problem: one can rst construct a potential
Zt = e
−αt−g(Xt) and then model the pricing kernel asMt = Ztξ
P
t with a non-trivial martingale
component ξPt . This modication relaxes the constraint on market prices of risk and permits
more freedom in model calibration. For example, Filipovic et al. (52) develop a linear-
rational term structure model following Roger's potential approach. The initial specication
is too restrictive to match observed dynamics of bond risk premiums. For this reason,
the authors incorporate a martingale component which gives them the freedom to model
additional unspanned factors. Such unspanned risk factors only aect the risk premium as
they enter through the equivalent martingale measure and they aect the distribution of
future bond prices under the physical measure P but not under the risk-neutral measure Q.
These unspanned factors are similar to the unspanned components of the macro risk factors
in the term structure model of Joslin et al. (92).
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3.4 Path-Dependence of Pricing Kernels
This section will discuss the path dependence of equilibrium asset pricing models. Pricing
kernels are often transition-independent in an endowment economy such as Lucas' tree model.
Nonetheless, the production economy (e.g., the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model) naturally exhibits
transition dependence. This subtle dierence can generate quite dierent implications for
term structure models developed by the equilibrium approach. For the log-utility case, one
can modify the Lucas' tree model to restore the path-dependent dynamics for asset pricing.
3.4.1 Ross' Recovery
Recently, Ross (119) proposes a recovery theorem and claims that this theory allows for the
entire recovery of both the pricing kernel and real probabilities from option prices. Under
his model assumptions, option prices can help forecast not only the average return but also
the entire return distribution if the state variable is Markovian and determines the aggregate
consumption. This result is quite surprising. In the log-normal Black-Scholes world the stock
returns are normally distributed but its drift is not directly observable nor priced in options.
How could one infer the distribution of stock returns from option prices which contain little
information about the drift of returns? Under the risk-neutral measure, the expected return
on all assets is the risk free rate. How could one know the risk adjustment and use risk-
neutral prices to estimate natural probabilities? In models with a representative agent, this
is equivalent to knowing both the agent's risk aversion and subjective probability measure.
Both types of information are not directly observable however.
Here is the setup of Ross' recovery theorem (119): consider a representative agent (one-
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period) model in an economy described by a nite time-homogeneous Markov process and
indexed by Xi. As a key assumption, Ross denes that a pricing kernel is called transition
independent if there is a positive function of the states, φ(X) = U ′(c(X)), and a positive
constant δ such that for any transition from Xi to Xj, the pricing kernel has the form




This allows us to express the Arrow-Debreu state price, p(Xi, Xj), of the contingent claim
which pays one dollar when the next state is Xj given the current state Xi with transition
probability f(Xi, Xj):
p(Xi, Xj) = M(Xi, Xj)f(Xi, Xj) = δ
U ′(c(Xj))
U ′(c(Xi))









′(c(Xi)) ≡ φ(Xi) > 0. In the matrix
form, the above equation can be rewritten as DP = δFD for F = 1
δ
DPD−1, where P is
the N × N matrix of Arrow-Debreu state prices [pij], F is N × N matrix of the natural
transition probability, [fij], and D is the diagonal matrix with the marginal utility across all




N). Since F is a positive matrix whose rows are transition
probabilities, the sum of each row elements has to be one, that is, F~e = ~e, where ~e denotes
a N × 1 vector with ones in all the entries. Then we have F~e = 1
δ
DPD−1~e = ~e, which
is equivalent to PD−1~e = δD−1~e. If we denote z ≡ D−1~e, this equality simply becomes
Pz = δz. By no-arbitrage condition, the matrix P is nonnegative. If P is irreducible,
the Perron-Frobenius Theorem states that any nonnegative irreducible matrix has a unique
positive characteristic vector, z, and an associated positive characteristic root, λ. Applying
the Perron-Frobenius theorem to Pz = δz leads to the major claim in Ref. (119): If there is
no arbitrage, the pricing matrix is irreducible, and it is generated by a transition independent
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kernel, then there exists a unique (positive) solution to the problem of nding the physical
probability transition matrix, F , the discount rate, δ, and the pricing kernel, M .
As Borovicka et al. (18) point out, what is recovered by Ross' theorem via the Perron-
Frobenius theory is not the physical probability but the long forward measure. The key
assumption in Ross (119) is the transition-independent pricing kernel. According to Propo-
sition 10, the property of transition independence imposes a strong restriction on the market
prices of risk and precludes a nontrivial martingale component in the pricing kernel. To
discuss continuous-time economy, the concept of path dependence needs to be extended:
Denition 4. In continuous time models, the pricing kernelMt is called transition (or path)







i.e., the pricing kernel is of the Rogers' potential form Mt = e
−αt+g(Xt) with g(x) ≡ log φ(x).
3.4.2 Lucas' Tree Model of an Endowment Economy
Now let's discuss the classic Lucas' tree model. Consider a representative agent with time-
additive CRRA utility who consumes the perishable fruit/good dropping o from the Lucas'
tree. This consumption good is given by Dt = φ(Xt), which is a function of the single state
variable Xt that solves the stochastic dierential equation:
dXt = µX(Xt)dt+ σX(Xt)dWt. (3.84)












where δ is the time-discount parameter and γ is the representative agent's risk aversion.
Obviously, the pricing kernel is transition-independent. Variations of Lucas' tree model are
usually featured with such transition-independent pricing kernels9, and the risk premiums
in such models are restricted according to Proposition 10.
If the perishable good follows D(Xt) = e
Xt , the representative agent with CRRA utility
will consume c(Xt) = D(Xt) = e
Xt to clear the consumption market. It is straightforward
to deduce the pricing kernel Mt = e
−δt−γ(Xt−X0) and the market price of risk ϑt = γσ(Xt).
The default-free zero coupon bond price in this economy is given by




γ(Xt−XT )] = e−δ(T−t)+γXtEPt [e
−γXT ], (3.86)
where the term EPt [e
−γXT ] can be computed if the (conditional) moment generating function
of XT given Xt is analytically known. Under regularity conditions
10, the state variable has
a limiting stationary distribution such that limT→∞ E
P
t [e
−γXT ] is some constant. If so, the
long bond price is proportional to e−δ(T−t)+γXt and the long forward rate is equal to the
time discount factor δ. For example, suppose X follows the OrnsteinUhlenbeck process,
dXt = κ(θ −Xt)dt+ σdWt, as in Vasicek (127). Then the interest rate process is:




which is countercyclical with Xt. In good stats (high Xt), the marginal utility e
−γXt and
risk-free rate rt are both low, asking for high bond prices. The market price of risk is ϑ = γσ
9For example, consumption-based asset pricing models are usually driven by exogenous dividend pro-
cesses just like the Lucas' tree. In an endowment economy with heterogeneous agents, if the Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium allocation exists, then it is also Pareto optimal; one can eectively derive the pricing kernel from
the social planner's utility gradient which is a smooth function of the aggregate endowment.
10See Ref. 94 for further reference.
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and the volatility of long bond returns is σ∞ = −γσ = −ϑ. This economic model is similar
to Example 3.1 where Xt is pro-cyclical with rt. In general, Rogers' potential approach for
term structure modeling can be supported by an endowment economy where a representative
agent consumes the exogenously given dividends.
Clearly, Lucas' tree model precludes the permanent martingale component. As a
remedy, the pricing kernel can be augmented with an exponential martingale, i.e., Mt =
e−ρt+g(Xt)ξPt , where the martingale component satises
dξPt
ξPt
= −[ϑt+σ∞]dWt with σ∞(Xt) =
g′(Xt)σX(Xt). By Itô's lemma, we have
dMt
Mt
= −rtdt−ϑtdWt, where the interest rate process
now becomes11
rt = ρ− g′(Xt)µX(Xt)−
1
2
[g′′(Xt)− g′(Xt)2]σX(Xt)2 + ϑtg′(Xt)σX(Xt). (3.88)
The introduction of a non-degenerate permanent martingale makes the pricing kernel path-
dependent and allows risk premiums to be exible for model calibration. Next subsection
will demonstrate that the pricing kernel, Mt = e
−ρt+g(Xt)ξPt , can be supported by general
equilibrium of a production economy.
3.4.3 Cox-Ingersoll-Ross Equilibrium of a Production Economy
Cox et al. (34 and 35) develop a continuous-time general equilibrium model of the production
economy to examine the behavior of asset prices which are endogenously determined. For
illustration, let's work out a simplied CIR model12 where a single representative agent has





12A nite-time version of this example is provided in Chapter 10 of Ref. 45.
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The agent has access to a production technology with the optimal capital-stock process K
(starting from K0 > 0) dened by the Itô process:
dKt = (aKtXt −Dt)dt+ εKt
√
XtdWt, (3.90)
which is driven by a single Brownian motionWt under P. The state variableX can be thought
of as a shock process that inuence the productivity of capital K. This state variable evolves
as a square-root diusion process:
dXt = (b− κXt)dt+ σ
√
XtdWt, (3.91)
with strictly positive scalars a, b, κ, σ, and ε that satisfy 2b > σ2 and a > ε2. The optimal






= (aXt − δ)dt+ ε
√
XtdWt. (3.92)






which, by Itô's lemma, can be written as
dMt
Mt








The interest rate is rt = (a− ε2)Xt, which solves another square-root diusion process:
drt = κ(r
∗ − rt)dt+ σr
√
rtdWt, (3.94)
where r∗ = b(a− ε2)/κ and σr = σ
√
a− ε2. This establishes the one-factor CIR model. One








Xt > 0, (3.95)
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denes the Girsanov kernel for risk-neutral measure Q under which the interest rate solves





When the Feller condition holds (i.e., the origin is inaccessible) under both P and Q, one
can nd the long forward rate in this economy (as demonstrated in Example 2.1),
ρ =
2b(a− ε2)√
(σε+ κ)2 + 2σ2(a− ε2) + (σε+ κ)
> 0. (3.97)





(σε+ κ)2 + 2σ2(a− ε2) + (σε+ κ)
> 0. (3.98)
It is obvious that ϑt + σ∞ > 0 and the permanent martingale component is non-degenerate.
Proposition 11. The pricing kernel Mt in this CIR economy is transition-dependent, as it
cannot be expressed in the potential form, e−ρt+g(Xt), for some well-behaved function g(·).
Proof. Suppose we could writeMt = e





Xt, which implies g
′(Xt) = − εσ . By Eq. (3.123), the interest rate is












which conicts with the equilibrium result rt = (a− ε2)Xt because ρ+ εbσ > 0.
With a transition-dependent pricing kernel, the CIR model does not suer from the

















where the expected growth rate of the stock-capital is always less than the risk-free rate rt.
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Why does the CIR model admit a transition-dependent pricing kernel? To see this, we
consider a simple Lucas' tree model where the aggregate dividend grows as the geometric
Brownian motion, dDt
Dt
= µdt + σdWt, with constant µ and σ. The pricing kernel here
is Mt = e
−δtD−1t which is another geometric Brownian motion
dMt
Mt
= −rdt − σdWt, with a




denes an exponential martingale e−Xt that does not aect the term structure. Either Xt
or Dt can be chosen as the state variable in this model, since either of them contains all the
information that a representative agent needs to forecast the future state of the economy.
Can we take Dt as the only state variable in the CIR model? The answer is no.
Knowing Dt alone is not enough for the representative agent to forecast the future state
even over an innitesimal period because both the drift and diusion terms of Dt in Eq.
(3.92) are stochastically driven by the underlying variable Xt. Forecasting the next state of
the economy (at t + dt) requires the knowledge of both Dt and Xt. Since the sample path
of D is determined by the sample path of X, knowing the sample path of X up to time t is
sucient to reconstruct Dt. Therefore, the state of the economy is characterized by the full
history of X up to time t. Such history-dependence accounts for the transition-dependent
property of pricing kernel in the CIR model13. This property suggests that the CIR general
equilibrium is an appropriate economic framework for term structure modeling14. One can
modify the Lucas' model to remedy the restriction issue in Proposition 10.
13If the pricing kernel can be expressed as a potential, Mt = e
−ρt+g(Xt), then it means that the state of
the economy is always determined by Xt, and there is no need to know the full history of X.
14Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (74) (HJM) developed a term structure modeling framework based on
specifying forward rates volatilities adn the market price of risk. Jin and Glasserman (91) show that every
HJM arbitrage-free model can be supported by a production economy equilibrium of Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (35).
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Corollary 14. For the log-utility case, the equilibrium Lucas model of an endowment econ-
omy can be modied to coincide with the equilibrium CIR model of a production economy.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.5
This result indicates the potential equivalence of these equilibrium models. However,
it may not hold beyond logarithmic utility. The advantages of CIR general equilibrium are
obvious. First, it allows the pricing kernel to be path dependent without losing internal
consistency. Second, it provides a detailed equilibrium picture showing how the underlying
economic variables aect the term structure. Third, it can give an equilibrium support to
models constructed from the arbitrage approach.
3.4.4 Extension and Future Research
So far we have focused on the bond market and term structure models. The analysis can
be easily extended to the equity market. For notational convenience, let's keep using the
k × 1 vector Xt to denote a fundamental group of state variables which determine the term
structure of interest rates and thus aect the prices of all traded securities in the economy.
The word fundamental" is in the sense this group of variables inuences all nancial assets
through the stochastic discount factor. Fixed-income securities and derivatives (including
bonds across dierent maturities, discount or coupon bonds, and bond derivatives) are solely
priced by these fundamental state variables. As before, the long forward rate is constant if
the economy is driven by recurrent Markovian processes. The state space can be expanded
by including the m × 1 vector Yt which denotes the state variables that solely aect the
pricing of other risky securities (equities). Both Xt and Yt are driven by a vector d × 1
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Brownian motions. It is convenient to think of Xt as bond-market risk factors and Yt as
equity-market risk factors. By construction, Xt and Yt can be orthogonal to each other: if
the i-th state variable in Yt, say Y
(i)
t , is correlated with the j-th state variable in Xt, say
X
(j)
t , then one can decompose and carve out the correlated component in Y
(i)
t and move it
from the Yt group to the Xt group. The following denition can be helpful.
Denition 5. The pricing kernel for the overall market is said to be orthogonally factorized
















The time-t value of any X-state-contingent claim ψ(XT ) is independent of the Y -state space:























For example, the discount bond prices solely depend on X state variables.
The above extension can be useful for asset pricing problems as the pricing kernel in
general is transition-dependent. Stochastic volatility models exhibit such transition depen-
dence. These include the option-pricing model by Heston (76) and also the recent devel-
opment by Christoersen, Heston, and Jacobs (31) who propose a GARCH option model
with a variance-dependent pricing kernel. If we make a transition from the physical proba-
bility to the long forward measure, equity prices will be adjusted by the long bond volatility.
The advantage of long forward measure is the constant long rate, similar to the risk-neutral




This article applies the martingale approach to explore several issues regarding the pricing
kernel decomposition when the long bond is taken as numeraire. The central condition in
my development is that the long forward rate is constant, a plausible condition in a normal
economy. This condition imposes constraints on the asymptotic behaviors of long bonds and
leads to a simple proof for the Hansen-Scheinkman decomposition, i.e., the pricing kernel
can be expressed as a product of a transitory component and a permanent martingale one.
When the state variables are stationary and recurrent, the long forward rate has to
be at and the decomposition result immediately follows from the martingale arguments.
This long-run factorization may not be unique if the economy does not permit an equivalent
martingale measure. Examination of the long forward measure produces an explicit expres-
sion for the permanent martingale component. This demonstrates how the transitory and
permanent components comove with each other over time. More importantly, this result re-
veals an implicit restriction in a popular approach of modeling interest rates. This approach
directly species the pricing kernel as a probabilistic Markov potential, which neglects the
permanent martingale in the pricing kernel and thus imposes problematic constrains on the
market prices of risk which can distort model calibration.
Finally, a comparison is made between the endowment economy (e.g., Lucas' tree
model) and the production economy to illustrate the origin of path-dependence of pricing
kernels. To restore path dependence, a simple remedy is suggested for equilibrium models
of the endowment economy for the log-utility case. This work shows the advantages of
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross general equilibrium for modeling interest rates and asset prices.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 7
If limT→∞ f(t, T,Xt) = ρ, then limT→∞ z(t, T,Xt) = ρ by Lemma 1. Under (A4), we can
write z(t, T,Xt) = z(T − t,Xt) and introduce τ ≡ T − t ≥ 0 to dene a new function
h(τ,Xt) ≡ [z(τ,Xt)− ρ] · τ, (3.103)
which allows us to express
P (T − t,Xt) = P (τ,Xt) = exp[−z(τ,Xt) · τ ] = exp[−ρτ − h(τ,Xt)] (3.104)
Therefore, the forward rate can be written as
f(T − t,Xt) = −












Since limT→∞ z(T−t,Xt) = ρ and ∂h(τ,Xt)∂τ = z(τ,Xt)−ρ+
∂z(τ,Xt)
∂τ






τ = 0. (3.107)
For an arbitrary state Xt = x, we are interested in the asymptotic behavior of h(τ, x) =
[z(τ, x)− ρ] · τ which however is a type of 0 ·∞ limit. Applying the L'Hôpital's rule yields
lim
τ→∞












which is again a type of 0 · ∞ limit by Eq. (3.107). Repeating the L'Hôpital's rule yields
lim
τ→∞































τ 2 = 0. (3.110)




+ ρ+ w(τ, x), (3.111)
where w(τ, x) is a residual term decays to zero at a speed faster than τ−1. This follows from




τ + 2 ∂z
∂τ
)
τ 2 = 0 in Eq. (3.110).
As a result, we have
lim
τ→∞
h(τ, x) = lim
τ→∞
[g(x) + w(τ, x)τ ] = g(x). (3.112)
If we dene ε(τ,Xt) ≡ g(Xt) − h(τ,Xt) = w(τ,Xt) · τ , then limT→∞ ε(T − t,Xt) = 0. This
leads to Eq. (3.10) in Proposition 7:
logP (T − t,Xt) = −ρ · (T − t)− h(T − t,Xt)
= −ρ · (T − t)− g(Xt) + ε(T − t,Xt). (3.113)
3.6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Given that the long forward rates fl(s,Xs) and fl(t,Xt) exist for s < t, we can dene
q(s) = limT→∞ P (s, T,Xs)
1
T = e−fl(s,Xs) and q(t) = limT→∞ P (t, T,Xt)
1
T = e−fl(t,Xt) where
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where the rst inequality follows from the Fatou's lemma, the second inequality is due to
Hölder's inequality and the last step is obtained by the dominated convergence theorem. As
the random variable Z ≥ 0 is arbitrary with EQt [Z] = 1, it must be that q(t) ≤ q(s) which
is equivalent to fl(s,Xs) ≤ fl(t,Xt) for arbitrary s < t.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 9
Let's take the limit T →∞ to pass into the long forward measure QL, which is conceptually
the large T limit of QT . Consider two arbitrary time points s and t, with 0 ≤ s ≤ t < ∞.
The notation will be abused a little bit by replacing the superscript T with the symbol ∞






















For the long bond price process P∞(t, T,Xt) = e
−ρ(T−t)−g(Xt), the long bond return volatility
is independent of t and given by
lim
T→∞













































Comparing Eq. (3.119) with Eq. (3.12), one can see that the permanent (local) martingale
component ξPt in the factorization Mt = e
−ρt φ(X0)
φ(Xt)
















In other words, ξPt solves the Itô diusion process
dξPt
ξPt
= −[ϑt + σ∞(Xt)]>dWt, (3.121)
where σ∞ = ΣX
∂g
∂X
. This expression reveals the economic content of the permanent martin-
gale component. Its Girsanov kernel is the sum of long bond return volatility and market
price of risk. To change from the physical probability to the long forward measure, all the
adjustment one needs is to add the long bond volatility to the market prices of risk.
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3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose the SDF (or pricing kernel) is constructed from a potential, say Mt = e
−αtf(Xt).
A smooth nonnegative function f(x) can always be written as f(x) = eg(x) for some other
smooth function g(x). Using Itô's lemma, one can derive that
dMt
Mt
= −rt(Xt)dt+ g′(Xt)>ΣX(Xt)dWt, (3.122)
where g′(x) = dg(x)
dx
and the interest rate is given by














The market price of risk is ϑt(Xt) = −g′(Xt)>ΣX which denes the Girsanov kernel of dQdP .
With Mt = e
−αt+g(Xt), the discount bond price is found to be




g(XT )−g(Xt)] = e−α(T−t)EPt [e
∫ T
t dg(Xs)], (3.124)














Substituting the above expression into Eq. (3.124) and using Eq. (3.123), one can derive
that








∣∣∣∣Ft] = EQ [e− ∫ Tt rsds∣∣∣∣Ft] . (3.126)
If the Markov process Xt has a stationary limiting distribution independent of the initial
states, then at the long maturity limit the discount bond price satises (up to some constant)












For this long bond P∞(t, T,Xt) = e
−α(T−t)−g(Xt), we can use Itô's lemma to show that
dP∞(t, T,Xt)
P∞(t, T,Xt)











which implies µ∞(Xt)− rt = g′(Xt)>ΣXΣ>Xg′(Xt) = −σ∞(Xt) ·ϑt(Xt). In this general setup,
it becomes obvious that σ∞(Xt) = g
′(Xt)
>ΣX = −ϑt(Xt).
3.6.5 Proof of Corollary 14
The pricing kernel can be derived from the rst order condition for the representative agent's
problem. This gives Mt = e
−δtU ′(Dt) = e
−δt+g(Dt). We can assume that the exogenous
aggregate dividend evolves as a general Itô diusion process:
dDt
Dt
= µD(Xt)dt+ σD(Xt)dWt, (3.129)
where the state variable Xt is self-governed in the sense that dXt = µX(Xt)dt+ σX(Xt)dWt.
In this general setup, the pricing kernel can depend on sample paths and this Lucas-type

















The market price of risk for the representative CRRA-utility agent is
ϑt = −g′(Dt)DtσD(Xt) = −
U ′′(Dt)
U ′(Dt)
DtσD(Xt) = γσD(Xt). (3.131)
which is the product of the investors' relative risk aversion and the instantaneous volatility












suggesting that the interest rate is rt = δ+ γµD(Xt)− 12γ(γ + 1)σ
2
D(Xt) which only depends





δ + µD(Xt)− σ2D(Xt)
]
dt− σD(Xt)dWt. (3.133)
Now the interest rate is rt = δ+µD(Xt)−σ2D(Xt) and the market price of risk is ϑt = σD(Xt).
The specication of µD = aXt − δ and σD = ε
√
Xt reproduces the pricing kernel Eq. (3.93)
and the interest rate rt = (a− ε2)Xt in the CIR model. Securities whose contractual payos













with the boundary condition V (Xt, T ) = Ψ(Xt, T ). It is exactly the CIR valuation equation.
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